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Christianity and Human Rights: 
Past Contributions and Future Challenges 
 




This Article analyzes the historical sources and forms of human 
rights in Western legal and Christian traditions, and identifies key 
questions about the intersections of Christianity and human rights in 
modern contexts. The authors identify nine distinctions between different 
conceptions of rights correlating with four types of jural relationships, and 
argue that leading historical accounts of human rights attribute “subjective” 
rights too narrowly to Enlightenment and post-Enlightenment legal 
thought. Earlier forms of classical Roman law and medieval canon law, 
and legal norms developed by Protestant reformers of the sixteenth and 
seventeenth centuries shaped Western human rights regimes in 
historically important ways, anticipating most of the rights formulation of 
modern liberals. In response to contemporary scholars who criticize 
human rights paradigms as inadequate or incompatible with Christian faith 
and practice, the authors argue that rights should remain a part of 
Christian moral, legal, and political discourse, and that Christians should 
remain a part of pluralistic public debates about the appropriate scope and 
substance of human rights protections.  
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 Fifty years ago, the world welcomed some of the most remarkable human rights 
documents it had ever seen.  The United States Congress passed the Civil Rights Act of 
1964 and the Voting Right Act of 1965.3  This was America’s strongest statutory rebuke 
to its long and tragic history of racism, chauvinism, nativism, and religious and cultural 
bigotry.  Born of the civil rights movement and inspired especially by African-American 
churches,4 these two acts declared anathema on all manner of discrimination in the 
voting booth, in public accommodations, in schools, and in the workplace.  They called 
American courts and citizens to give full and faithful protection to the rights of everyone 
regardless of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.  And they called America back 
not only to the high promise of the Reconstruction Amendments ratified in the aftermath 
of the Civil War,5 but also to the founding ideals set out in its ur text, the Declaration of 
Independence: “that all men [now persons] are created equal, that they are endowed by 
their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the 
pursuit of Happiness.”6 
 
 Fifty years ago, the Second Vatican Council, speaking to and for a billion plus 
Catholics world-wide, opened up a new chapter in its mission and ministry with a series 
of sweeping new papal and conciliar declarations – Pacem in Terris, Dignitatis 
Humanae, Gaudium et Spes, and Lumen Gentium.7  Rejecting its anti-democratic and 
anti-rights posture of a century before, the Catholic Church now taught that each and 
every human being is created by God with “dignity, intelligence and free will ... and has 
rights flowing directly and simultaneously from their very nature.”8  Such rights include 
the right to life and adequate standards of living, to moral and cultural values, to 
religious activities, to assembly and association, to marriage and family life, and to 
various social, political, and economic benefits and opportunities. The Church 
emphasized the religious rights of conscience, worship, assembly, and education, 
calling them the “first rights” of any civic order.9  It also stressed the need to balance 
individual and associational rights, particularly those involving the church, family, and 
 
3 78 Stat. 241; 79 Stat. 437. 
4 See Robert M. Franklin, “Rehabilitating Democracy: Restoring Civil Rights and Leading the Next Human 
Rights Revolution,” (herein). 
5 See U.S. Const. amend. XIII; U.S. Const. amend XIV; U.S. Const. amend XV. 
6 U.S. Declaration of Independence (1776), paragraph 2. 
7 See Russell Hittinger, “An Issue of First Importance: Reflections on the 50th Anniversary of Dignitatis 
Humanae,” (herein).  
8 Pacem in Terris, para. 9 (1963), reprinted in Joseph Gremillion, ed., The Gospel of Peace and Justice: 
Catholic Social Teaching Since Pope John (Maryknoll, N.Y.: Orbis, 1976), 203. 
9 Ibid., 203-18. 
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school.  It urged the abolition of discrimination on grounds of sex, race, color, social 
distinction, language, and religion.  And the Church called on clergy and laity alike to be 
ambassadors and advocates for the rights of all persons, especially the “least” of God’s 
children, as the Bible called them – the poor, needy, sick, and handicapped; widows, 
orphans, and sojourners; the incarcerated and incapacitated; and children, born and 
unborn.10  
 
 And fifty years ago, the United Nations, embracing almost all 186 nation-states 
around the world at the time, passed the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights.11  Only 
two decades before passage of these twin covenants, the world had stared in horror 
into Hitler's death camps and Stalin's gulags where all sense of humanity and dignity 
had been brutally sacrificed.  It had witnessed the slaughter of 60 million people around 
the world in six years of unprecedented brutality.  In response, the world had seized 
anew on the ancient concept of human dignity, claiming this as the "ur-principle" of a 
new world order.12 The Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948 opened its 
preamble with the classic words: “recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal 
and inalienable rights of all members of the human family is the foundation of freedom, 
justice, and peace in the world.”13  The 1966 international Covenants sought to translate 
the general principles of the Universal Declaration into more specific precepts.  The 
International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (1966) posed as 
essential to human dignity the rights to self-determination, subsistence, work, welfare, 
security, education, and cultural participation.14  The International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights (1966) set out a long catalogue of rights to life and to security of person 
and property, freedom from slavery and cruelty, basic civil and criminal procedural 
protections, rights to travel and pilgrimage, freedoms of religion, expression, and 
assembly, rights to marriage and family life, and freedom from discrimination on 
grounds of race, color, sex, language, and national origin.15  These documents were 
declarations of both hope and repentance – expressions of sober optimism about the 
 
10 Ibid. 
11 See Ian Brownlie and Guy S. Goodwin-Gill, eds., Basic Documents on Human Rights, 6th ed., 
(Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2010), 370-379; 388-404. These documents are also 
available online. See: “International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,” 
http://www.ohchr.org/en/professionalinterest/pages/ccpr.aspx; and “International Covenant on Economic, 
Social, and Cultural Rights,” http://www.ohchr.org/EN/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/CESCR.aspx, accessed 
March 17, 2015.  
12 The term “ur-principle” is from Louis Henkin et al., Human Rights (New York: Foundation, 1999), p. 80. 
13 Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948), in See Ian Brownlie and Guy S. Goodwin-Gill, eds., 
Basic Documents on Human Rights, 6th ed., (Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2010), 39-44. 
See online resource, “Universal Declaration of Human Rights,” 
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/UDHR/Pages/Introduction.aspx, accessed March 17, 2015.  
14 See “International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights,” in Ian Brownlie and Guy S. 
Goodwin-Gill, eds., Basic Documents on Human Rights, 6th ed., (Oxford; New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2010), 370-379. 
15 “International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,” Ian Brownlie and Guy S. Goodwin-Gill, eds., 
Basic Documents on Human Rights, 6th ed., (Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2010), 388-
404. 
4 
human condition, and of the pressing need to prevent further catastrophes.16  They 
have inspired a whole series of subsequent international and domestic human rights 
instruments designed to broaden the human rights regime, and to extend its promise 
and protection to all manner of persons and peoples.  
 
 Today, various classes of rights are commonly distinguished.17  The most typical 
distinctions are between: 
 
1. subjective rights (those claimed by subjective individuals or groups or by 
parties who are subjects to an authority) versus objective right or 
rightness (conduct that is considered proper or orderly when measured 
against an objective standard), 
2. natural rights (those that are based on nature, natural law, or human 
nature) and positive rights (those that are based in the positive law of the 
state, church, or other legal authority), 
3. public or constitutional rights (those which operate vis-à-vis the state) and 
private or personal rights (those which operate vis-à-vis other private 
parties),  
4. rights of individuals and rights of associations or groups (whether private 
groups, like businesses or churches, or public groups, like municipalities 
or political parties), 
5. substantive rights (those that create or confirm goods or entitlements) and 
procedural rights (those that guarantee subjects certain types of 
treatment by government officials), 
6. human rights (those that inhere in a human qua human) and civil rights 
(those that inhere in citizens or civil subjects), 
7. unalienable or nonderogable rights (those that cannot be given or taken 
away) and alienable or derogable rights (those that can be voluntarily 
given away or can be taken away under specified legal conditions like 
due process of law), 
8. will theories of rights (that emphasize the individual’s rational choices and 
desires) and interest theories of rights (that focus on individual’s needs 
and society’s duties to meet those needs),  
9. first generation civil and political rights, second generation social, cultural, 
and economic rights, and third generation rights to peace, environmental 
 
16 See Samuel Moyn, The Last Utopia: Human Rights in History (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press, 2010); see further Samuel Moyn, “The Secret History of Constitutional Dignity,” Yale Human 
Rights and Development Law Journal 17 (2014): 39-71. 
17 See, among many others, W.N. Hohfeld, Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial 
Reasoning, and Other Legal Essays (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1919); Carl Wellman, An 
Approach to Rights (Dordrecht and Boston: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1997): Michael J. Perry, The 
Idea of Human Rights: Four Inquiries (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998); Joel Feinberg, Rights, 
Justice, and the Bounds of Liberty: Essays in Social Philosophy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University 
Press, 1980); Maurice Cranston, “Human Rights, Real and Supposed,” in Patrick Hayden, ed., The 
Philosophy of Human Rights (St. Paul, MN: Paragon House, 2001), 163-173; Joel Feinberg, “The Nature 
and Value of Rights,” in ibid., 174-186; Thomas W. Pogge, “How Should Human Rights be Conceived?” 
in ibid., 187-211; Martha C. Nussbaum, “Capabilities and Human Rights,” in ibid., 212-240. 
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protection, and orderly development as they are called in international 
human rights law. 
 
These different types of rights often correlate with different jural relationships.  Some 
scholars distinguish between: 
 
1. rights (something that triggers a correlative duty in others) and privileges 
(something that no one has a right to interfere with), 
2. active rights (the power or capacity to do or assert something oneself) and 
passive rights (the entitlement or claim to be given or allowed something 
by someone or something else), 
3. rights or privileges (claims or entitlements to something) and liberties or 
immunities (freedoms or protections from interference), 
4. positive liberty or freedom (the right to do something) versus negative 
liberty or freedom (the right to be left alone).  
 
These sundry rights distinctions have emerged over nearly two millennia of 
Western law – some more recently than others.  Western jurists, since Roman law 
times, have talked quite easily about rights and liberties – iura and libertates as they 
were called in Latin, “ryhtes,” “rihtes,” and “rihta(e) as they came to be called in later 
Anglo-Saxon texts.18 Jurists used rights language to define the law’s protection, support, 
limitations, and entitlements of persons and groups in society, and to map the proper 
interactions between political and other authorities and their respective subjects.  While 
Western jurists sometimes treated vaunted documents like the Magna Carta (1215)19 or 
the United States Bill of Rights (1791) with reverence, they usually thought of rights in 
simple instrumental and utilitarian terms.  After all, as Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. 
once put it, a right is “only the hypostasis of a prophecy,” a mere prediction of what 
might happen to “those who do things said to contravene it.”20   
 
 By contrast, a number of Christian theologians and philosophers today are more 
hesitant about rights language.  And some have engaged in heated debates and 
elaborate casuistry about the propriety of emphasizing subjective rights over objective 
right order, or personal liberties and entitlements over the moral virtues and duties of an 
eschatological faith.21 Yes, almost everyone acknowledges that Christians from the start 
embraced (subjective) religious rights, at least for the church and its members.  And 
many Christians today lament the myriad persecutions of Christians and others around 
the world,22 and the growing tension between religious freedom and sexual freedom in 
 
18 See entry for “right” in Oxford English Dictionary, 2nd ed. 20 vols. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1989); Alfred Kiralfky, “Law and Right in English Legal History,” in La formazione storica de diritto 
moderno in Europa (Florence: Leo S. Olschki, 1977), 3:1069-1086. 
19 See John Witte, Jr. “A New Magna Carta for the Early Modern Common Law: an 800th Anniversary 
Essay,” (herein). 
20 Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., “Natural Law,” Harvard Law Review 32 (1918): 40-44, at 42. 
21 See esp. Nigel Biggar, “Imprudent Jurisprudence? Human Rights and Moral Contingency,“ (herein). 
22 See Timothy Shah and Allen Hertzke, eds., Christianity and Freedom: Historical and Contemporary 
Perspectives (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016).  
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the United States.23  But many serious Christians today question seriously whether their 
spiritual predecessors really had much to do with rights, and whether modern human 
rights ideas faithfully express the moral norms and narratives of the Bible and the 
Christian tradition.24  These scholars call for better ideas and language to emphasize 
core virtues like faith, hope, and love and core goods like peace, order, and community.  
 
 How, then, does and should Christianity relate to human rights, and how do 
Christians today regard the monumental rights documents enacted fifty years ago? To 
address these questions, this journal symposium draws from the wisdom of six great 
scholars who explored these issues in their McDonald Distinguished Lectures on Law 
and Christianity at Emory University in March, 2014: Stanley Hauweras (Duke), Nigel 
Biggar (Oxford), Robert Franklin (Emory), Jean Porter (Notre Dame), Russell Hittinger 
(Tulsa), and Helen Alvare (George Mason).  We have supplemented this collection with 
chapters by Archbishop Desmond Tutu and John Witte.  The balance of this 
Introduction sets the story of Christianity and human rights in deeper historical context, 
and then maps some of the hard questions that challenge us today.   
 
 Together with our colleagues in the Center for the Study of Law and Religion at 
Emory University, we express our profound thanks to Ambassador Alonzo L. McDonald 
and his colleagues in the McDonald Agape Foundation for their generous support of this 
symposium issue and the McDonald Distinguished Scholar Lecture Series that lies 
behind it.  This lecture series, which will run through 2018, is designed to sponsor 
cutting edge scholarship that stokes the imaginations of church, state, and society about 
what the Christian faith, in all its diversity, offers to the worlds of law, politics, and 
culture.  We also wish to thank our Center colleagues, Amy Wheeler, Silas Allard, Anita 




The Contributions of Christianity to the Development of Western Rights  
 
 Traditional Accounts of Subjective and Objective Rights.  It might come as a 
surprise to some readers to learn that Christianity was a deep source of human rights in 
the Western legal tradition.  Our elementary textbooks have long taught us that the 
history of human rights began in the later seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.  
Human rights, many of us were taught, were products of the Western Enlightenment – 
creations of Grotius and Pufendorf, Locke and Rousseau, Montesquieu and Voltaire, 
Hume and Smith, Jefferson and Madison.  Human rights were the mighty new weapons 
forged by American and French revolutionaries who fought in the name of political 
democracy, personal autonomy, and religious freedom against outmoded Christian 
 
23 See the chapter by Helen Alvare, “Religious Freedom versus Sexual Expression: A Guide” (herein).   
24 See, e.g., Stanley Hauerwas, “How to Think Theologically About Rights” (herein).  For various 
constructive responses to such views, see Nicholas Wolterstorff, Justice in Love (Grand Rapids, Mich.: 
Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Co., 2011); Nicholas Wolterstorff, Justice Rights and Wrongs (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 2008); Timothy P. Jackson, Political Agape: Christian Love and Liberal 
Democracy (Grand Rapids, MI: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Co., 2015).  
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conceptions of absolute monarchy, aristocratic privilege, and religious establishment.  
Human rights were the keys that Western liberals finally forged to unchain themselves 
from the shackles of a millennium of Christian oppression of society and church 
domination of the state.  Human rights were the core ingredients of the new democratic 
constitutional experiments of the later eighteenth century forward. The only Christians to 
have much influence on this development, we were told, were a few early Church 
Fathers who decried pagan Roman persecution, a few brave medieval writers who 
defied papal tyranny, and a few early modern Anabaptists who debunked Catholic and 
Protestant persecution.25 
 
 Proponents of this conventional historiography have recognized that Western 
writers since classical Greek and Roman times often used the term “right” (ius in Latin, 
Recht in German, droit in French, diritto in Italian).  But the conventional argument is 
that, before the Enlightenment, the term “right” was usually used in an “objective” rather 
than a “subjective” sense.  “Objective right” or “rightness” means that something is the 
objectively right thing or action in the circumstances.  Objective right obtains when 
something is rightly ordered, is just or proper, is considered to be right or appropriate 
when judged against some objective or external standard.  “Right” is being used here as 
an adjective, not as a noun.  It is what is correct or proper, the right way of doing and 
ordering things, following the norms taught to us by reason and conscience, nature and 
custom.26  As Oliver O’Donovan once put it: “’To give each his right’ may include cutting 
off his head, if he has deserved it.  ‘Your right’ is simply what is coming to you.”27 
 
 This objective sense of right is quite different, the conventional argument 
continues, from the idea of right in a “subjective” sense – what is called a “subjective 
right.”  This is a right that is vested in a subject (whether an individual, group, or entity), 
and the subject usually can have that right protected or vindicated before an appropriate 
authority when the right is threatened or violated.  The subjective and objective senses 
of right can cohere, even overlap.  You can say that “a victim of theft has a right to have 
his property restored” or that “it is right for a victim of theft to have his property 
restored.”  Knowing nothing else, these are parallel statements.  But if the victim is a 
ruthless tycoon and the thief a starving child, the parallel is harder to draw.  Even 
though the subject (tycoon) has a subjective right to his property, it might not always be 
objectively right to respect or enforce that right.  Sometimes the subjective and objective 
senses of right are more clearly dissociated.  Even if it is objectively right for someone 
to perform an action, it does not always mean the beneficiary of that action has a 
subjective right to its performance.  Though it might be right for you to give alms to the 
poor, a poor person has no subjective right to receive alms from you.  Though it might 
be right for a parishioner to give tithes to the church, a church has no subjective right to 
 
25 See representative literature analyzed in Victoria Kahn, “Early Modern Rights Talk,” Yale Journal of 
Law and the Humanities 13 (2001): 391; Lynn Hunt, Inventing Human Rights: A History (New York: W.W. 
Norton, 2007); Samuel Moyn, “Substance, Scale, and Salience: The Recent Historiography of Human 
Rights,” The Annual Review of Law and Social Science 8 (2012): 123-140.   
26 See further Biggar, ”Imprudent Jurisprudence?”   
27 Oliver O’Donovan, “The Language of Rights and Conceptual History,” The Journal of Religious Ethics 
37 (June, 2009), 193-207, at 197. 
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receive tithes from that parishioner.   
 
 When pre-seventeenth century writers spoke of the “rights” or “natural rights” of a 
person, the conventional argument goes, they were really referring to the “duties” of a 
person – the right thing for the person to do in accordance with natural order or natural 
law.  As the great University of Chicago political philosopher and classicist, Leo Strauss, 
put it: “Natural right in its classic form is connected with a teleological view of the 
universe.  All natural beings have a natural end, a natural destiny, which determines 
what kind of operation is good for them.  In the case of men, reason is required for 
discerning these operations: reason determines what is by nature right with regard to 
man’s natural end.”28   
 
 Enlightenment philosophers, beginning with Thomas Hobbes and John Locke, 
Strauss continued, first began to use the term “right” or “natural right” in a subjective 
rather than an objective sense.  For the first time in the later seventeenth century, the 
term “right” was regularly used as a noun not as an adjective.  A “subjective right” was 
now viewed as a claim, power, or freedom which nature had vested in a subject, 
whether a person or entity.  If that subject’s right was threatened or violated, they could 
go to an appropriate authority to have that right vindicated.  The establishment of this 
subjective understanding of rights was the start to the modern discourse of human 
rights, we are told.  When Enlightenment figures spoke of “natural rights” or the “rights 
of man according to natural law,” they were increasingly describing what we usually 
mean by “rights” today – the inherent claims that the individual subject has to various 
natural goods like life, liberty, and property.  This was “an entirely new political doctrine,” 
writes Strauss.  “The premodern natural law doctrines taught the duties of man; if they 
paid any attention at all to his rights, they conceived them as essentially derivative from 
his duties.  As has been frequently observed, in the course of the seventeenth and 
eighteenth centuries a much greater emphasis was put on rights than ever had been 
before.  One may speak of a shift of emphasis from natural duties to natural rights.”29  
 
 Strauss’s full historical account of rights is much more nuanced than this, as are 
the later historical accounts of some of his best students who have found some place 
for earlier theories of subjective rights.30  Moreover, it must be remembered that Strauss 
himself (and some of his students) wrote their histories of rights in part to decry the 
unhinging of objective and subjective rights, and the consequent decay of modern right 
talk into a long subjective wish list of goods that had no objective basis.  And Strauss 
himself in some of his later writings spent a good deal of time mining the rich teachings 
 
28 Leo Strauss, Natural Right and History (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1953), 7. 
29 Ibid., 182.  See further id., The Political Philosophy of Hobbes: Its Basis and its Genesis, trans. Elsa 
Sinclair (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1952); id., What is Political Philosophy? And Other 
Studies (Glencoe, IL: The University of Chicago Press, 1959), esp. 197ff.   
30 See, esp. Michael P. Zuckert, The Natural Rights Republic: Studies in the Foundation of the American 
Political Tradition (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1996); id., Natural Rights and the New 
Republicanism (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994); id., Launching Liberalism: On Lockean 
Political Philosophy (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 2002).  
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of his own ancient tradition of Judaism.31  But, particularly when cast into popular 
secular form, as it usually is, this basic “Straussian” account of the Enlightenment 
origins of Western rights has persisted, with numerous variations, in many circles of 
discourse to this day.  
 
 Those circles of discourse include Christianity.  As noted above, a number of 
Christians today – Catholic, Orthodox, and Protestant alike – view human rights with 
suspicion, if not derision.  Many view human rights as a dangerous invention of 
Enlightenment liberalism, predicated on a celebration of reason over revelation, of 
greed over charity, of nature over Scripture, of the individual over the community, of the 
pretended sovereignty of man over the absolute sovereignty of God.32  Others view 
human rights as a tried and tired experiment that is no longer effective, even a fictional 
faith whose folly has now been fully exposed33 – “nonsense upon stilts,” as Jeremy 
Bentham once called it.34   Others view human rights as instruments of neo-colonialism 
 
31 Leo Strauss, Jewish Philosophy and the Crisis of Modernity: Essays and Lectures in Modern Jewish 
Thought, ed. Kenneth H. Green (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1997).  
32 This is the position often associated with the great Swiss Reformed theologian, Karl Barth.  See 
detailed sources in the recent study by Stephen J. Grabill, Rediscovering the Natural Law in Reformed 
Theological Ethics (Grand Rapids, MI: Wm. B. Eerdmans Pub. Co., 2006), 21-53.  While Barth was 
certainly opposed to much natural theology, natural law, and natural rights talk, he was not so adverse to 
human rights as he is often made out to be.  For example, as a pastor in Safenwil he worked hard to 
secure the rights of workers and unions, the right to secure better wages and working conditions, the right 
to secure a job that satisfied one's calling and that confirmed one’s "human dignity."  As a Christian 
socialist, he was a fierce advocate for the rights of the poor, the widow, the orphan, the sojourner.  As he 
put it: “God always stands on this and only on this side, always against the exalted and for the lowly, 
always against those who already have rights and for those from whom they are robbed and taken away.” 
And as principal author of the courageous 1934 Barmen Declaration against Nazism, Barth gave vivid 
new expression to the founding rights of the Calvinist tradition – the right to religious liberty and the right 
of religious leaders prophetically to condemn tyrants who abridge these first rights to religion.  See 
sources quoted and analyzed in George Hunsinger, “Karl Barth,” in John Witte, Jr. and Frank S. 
Alexander, eds., Modern Christian Teachings on Law, Politics, and Human Nature, 2 vols., (New York, 
2005), 1:352-380, 2:280-306. 
33 See, e.g., Alasdair MacIntyre, After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory (Notre Dame: University of Notre 
Dame Press, 1984), 69-70. Macintyre writes: "[T]he truth is plain: there are no such rights, and belief in 
them is one with belief in witches and in unicorns....Natural or human rights...are fictions."  See also John 
Milbank’s discussion of “dignity” and “rights” in political philosophy and Catholic moral theology in “Dignity 
Rather than Right,” Centre of Theology and Philosophy, Accessed February 11, 2015, 
http://theologyphilosophycentre.co.uk/papers/Milbank_DignityRatherThanRight.pdf.  Also see, from a 
nonreligious perspective, Richard Rorty, “Human Rights, Rationality, and Sentimentality” in Patrick 
Hayden, ed., Philosophy of Human Rights (St. Paul, MN: Paragon House, 2001), 241-257.  
34 Jeremy Bentham, “Anarchical Fallacies; Being an Examination of the Declaration of Rights issued 
during the French Revolution,” reprinted in Jeremy Waldron, ed., Nonsense Upon Stilts: Bentham, Burke 
and Marx on the Rights of Man (New York: Methuen, 1987), 53. The passage from which this phrase is 
taken reads: “That which has no existence cannot be destroyed – that which cannot be destroyed cannot 
require anything to preserve it from destruction. Natural rights is simple nonsense: natural and 
imprescriptible rights, rhetorical nonsense, – nonsense upon stilts. But this rhetorical nonsense ends in 
the old strain of mischievous nonsense: for immediately a list of these pretended natural rights is given, 
and those are so expressed as to present to view legal rights. And of these rights, whatever they are, 
there is not, it seems, any one of which any government can, upon any occasion whatever, abrogate the 
smallest particle.”  
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which the West uses to impose its values on the rest.35  Still others view rights talk as 
the wrong talk for deep and meaningful debate about questions of human dignity, social 
justice, peaceful order, and the common good.36   Duke University’s Übertheologian, 
Stanley Hauweras, has voiced powerful reservations about treating human rights as a 
heuristic for Christian morality, and he summarizes his case in the pages that follow, 
answering some of his critics along the way.37  Other Christian scholars share this 
skepticism, including leading Anglican moral theologian, Oliver O’Donovan,38 
distinguished Catholic philosopher, Alasdair McIntyre,39 Orthodox Ecumenical Patriarch 
Bartholomew,40 and scores of mainline Protestant and Evangelical scholars influenced 
by Karl Barth’s early “Nein!” to natural law and natural rights talk.41  Distinguished 
Oxford theologian and ethicist, Nigel Biggar, engages this literature deftly and critically 
in his contribution to this symposium.42 
 
 At a certain level of abstraction, these Christian critiques of the moral and 
theological propriety of human rights mirror Straussian accounts of the Enlightenment 
origins of rights.  Various Straussians dismiss pre-modern Christian rights talk as a 
betrayal of Enlightenment liberalism.  Various Christians dismiss modern Enlightenment 
rights talk as a betrayal of Christianity.   
 
 Whatever the philosophical and theological merits of these respective positions 
might be, the historical narratives that have long supported them are no longer tenable.  
A growing body of important new scholarship has emerged to demonstrate that the 
Enlightenment was not so much a well spring of Western rights as a watershed in a long 
stream of rights thinking that began more than two millennia before.  A comprehensive 
history of Western rights is still very much a work in progress, with serious scholars still 
discovering and disputing the basic roots and routes of development.  But a broad 
outline of the story of the development of Western rights is becoming clearer.  And in 
this historical narrative, biblical, Roman law, medieval Catholic, and early modern 
 
35 See critical discussion in David Little, “Rethinking Human Rights: A Review Essay on Religion, 
Relativism, and Other Matters,” Journal of Religious Ethics 27 (Spring 1999), 151-177. 
36  See Mary Ann Glendon, Rights Talk: The Impoverishment of Political Discourse (New York: Free 
Press, 1991); Marta Cartabia, “Europe and Rights: Taking Dialogue Seriously,” European Constitutional 
Law Review 5 (2009). 
37 See, e.g., Stanley Hauerwas, “The Hauerwas Reader (Durham, NC/London: Duke University Press, 
2001), 51-74, 577-622. 
38 O’Donovan, “The Language of Rights and Conceptual History.” 
39 See MacIntyre, After Virtue; also see Alasdair MacIntyre, “How to Identify Ethical Principles” at 
http://videocast.nih.gov/pdf/ohrp_appendix_belmont_report_vol_1.pdf (Accessed February 12, 2015).  
40 See John Witte, Jr. and Michael Bourdeaux, eds., Proselytism and Orthodoxy in Russia: The New War 
for Souls (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 1999), 19-20.  See a good summary of Orthodox rights skepticism, 
summarized and answered in John McGuckin, The Ascent of Christian Law: Patristic and Byzantine 
Formulations of a New Civilization (Yonkers, NY: St. Vladimir’s Seminary Press, 2012). 
41 Karl Barth, Nein! Antwort an Emil Brunner (Munich: C. Kaiser, 1934). For an English translation see 
Karl Barth and Emil Brunner, Natural Theology: Comprising ‘Nature and Grace’ (Eugene, OR: Wipf and 
Stock, 2002).  For a recent example, see James Hutson, Forgotten Features of the Founding Era: The 
Recovery of Religious Themes in the Early American Republic (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2003), 
73-110. 
42 Biggar, “Imprudent Jurisprudence?”  
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Protestant Christian sources, among others, were just as important to the development 
of rights as modern Enlightenment liberalism.43  Here’s a short summary of what we 
now know.  
 
Biblical Foundations.  The Bible has long been used as the anchor text for 
Christian teachings on human rights.  The Bible is no human rights textbook, of 
course.44  But both the Hebrew Bible and the New Testament are filled with critical 
passages that have long inspired deep insights into the origin, nature, and purpose of 
human rights.   
 
Foremost among the Hebrew Bible texts is the Genesis account of the creation of 
man and woman.  Genesis 1 rehearses God’s creation of the world, and then comes to 
the apex:  
 
Then God said, “Let us make man in our image, after our 
likeness; and let them have dominion over the fish of the 
sea, and over birds of the air, and over the cattle, and over 
all the earth, and over every creeping thing that creeps upon 
the earth.” So God created man in his own image, in the 
image of God he created him; male and female he created 
them.  And God blessed them, and God said to them, “Be 
fruitful and multiply, and fill the earth and subdue it; and have 
dominion over the fish of the sea and over the birds of the air 
and over every living thing that moves upon the earth.”45   
Archbishop Desmond Tutu’s contribution to this symposium underscores how the 
idea of humans created in the image of God forms the deep ontological foundation of a 
Christian theory of human dignity, human freedom, and human rights.  Every human 
being is created as a “God-carrier,” Tutu writes, and as such deserves the utmost 
respect of his or her neighbors because of that inherent dignity.46  Every human being is 
created with reason, will, and conscience, and has the inherent right and duty to make 
choices guided by the law written on their hearts and rewritten in Scripture, tradition, 
and experience.  Tutu puts it memorably: “God, who alone has the perfect right to be a 
 
43 See recent overviews in Fabian Wittreck, Christentum und Menschenrechte (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 
2013); Michael Welker, ed., Quests for Freedom: Biblical – Historical – Contemporary (Göttingen: 
Neukirchen, 2015); John Witte, Jr. and Frank S. Alexander, eds., Christianity and Human Rights: An 
Introduction (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010); Johannes van der Ven, Human Rights or 
Religious Rules? (Leiden: Brill, 2010). 
44 Various scholars, however, have drawn many rights and related doctrines on the strength of the Bible.  
See, e.g., Jonathan Burnside, God, Justice, and Society: Aspects of Law and Legality in the Bible (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 2011); Robert F. Cochran and David VanDrunen, eds., Law and Bible: 
Justice, Mercy and Legal Institutions (Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 2013); Brent A. Strawn, et al 
eds., The Oxford Encyclopedia of the Bible and Law, 2 vols. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2015); 
Richard H. Hiers, Women’s Rights and the Bible: Implications for Christian Ethics and Social Policy 
(Eugene, OR: Pickwick Publications, 2012); David Novak, Covenantal Rights: A Study in Jewish Political 
Theory (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000).  
45 Gen. 1:26-28 (Revised Standard Version).  
46 Desmond M. Tutu, “The First Word: to be Human is to be Free” (herein). 
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totalitarian, has such a profound reverence for our freedom that He had much rather we 
went freely to hell than compel us to go to heaven.”47 
 
 The creation story continues with God’s command to the first man and the first 
woman to join together “in one flesh” and to “be fruitful and multiply.”48  This primal 
teaching about the first family was amplified in many later biblical passages that 
modeled marriage on Yahweh’s enduring love for his chosen people,49 and Christ’s 
eternal love for his church50 and that called parents and their broader kin networks to 
tend to the nurture, care, and education of children.  These biblical passages provided 
Jews and Christians alike with foundations on which to build their systems of family law, 
and the attendant special rights and duties afforded to spouses, parents, children, and 
kin.51   
 
 The creation story ends by recounting that humans are called to be caretakers 
and cultivators of nature, tasked to “dress” and “keep” the beauties of the Garden of 
Paradise even as they build toward the splendors of a Golden City in the eschaton.52  In 
this primal command of stewardship, medieval monks and modern Christian 
environmentalists alike have found the warrants for what we now call the third 
generation rights of nature and of orderly and sustainable development.53  
 
 Also fundamental to later Christian teachings were the many reciprocal rights and 
duties embedded in the 613 commandments of the Mosaic law and their amplification 
both by the Prophets of the Hebrew Bible and the Rabbis of the Talmud.54  This early 
Judaic understanding of rights and duties inspired the Church Fathers, medieval 
Catholics, and early modern Protestants alike.  Particularly, the two tables of the Ten 
Commandments set out in Exodus 20 and Deuteronomy 5 proved important to later 
Christian rights theorists. The First Table of the Decalogue set out the basic religious 
duties to honor, worship, and properly use God’s name.  The Second Table set out the 
 
47 Ibid. 
48 Gen. 1:28 (RSV). 
49 See biblical texts cited in John Witte, Jr., “The Covenant of Marriage: Its Biblical Roots, Historical 
Influence, and Modern Uses,” INTAMS review. Journal for the Study of Marriage and Spirituality 18 
(2012), 147-165. 
50 Eph. 5:32. 
51 See John Witte, Jr., From Sacrament to Contract: Marriage, Religion and Law in the Western 
Tradition, second ed., (Louisville, KY: Westminster John Knox Press, 2012). 
52 Gen. 2:15 (RSV). 
53 For related perspectives on the Bible, Christianity, and environmental issues, see: Bron Taylor, ed., 
The Encyclopedia of Religion and Nature (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010); John Chryssavgis 
and Bruce v. Foltz, eds., Toward an Ecology of Transfiguration: Orthodox Perspectives on Environment, 
Nature, and Creation (New York: Fordham University Press, 2013); Noah J. Toly and Daniel I. Block, 
eds., Keeping God’s Earth: The Global Environment in Biblical Perspective (Downers Grove, IL: 
InterVarsity Press, 2010); Willis J. Jenkins, Ecologies of Grace: Environmental Ethics and Christian 
Theology (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2008); John Copeland Nagle, “A Right to Clean 
Water,” in Witte and Alexander, eds. Christianity and Human Rights, 335-350; Willis Jenkins, “Religion 
and Environmental Rights,” in ibid., 330-345.  
54 David Novak, “The Judaic Foundations of Rights,” in John Witte, Jr. and Frank S. Alexander, eds., 
Christianity and Human Rights: An Introduction (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 47-63. 
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basic duties concerning marriage, family, and the household, life, property, and 
reputation.  While the Decalogue sets out the duties owed to God and neighbors, later 
Christian writers used this template to set out the correlative religious rights to godly 
worship and honor, and the correlative civil rights to life, property, reputation, and the 
marital household.55  
 
 The Mosaic law governed a “covenanted” people who were bound together in 
community with each other and with God.56  Already with Noah in the aftermath of the 
Flood, the Bible tells us, God had entered into a covenant with all humanity and 
nature.57  Both Jews and Christians would later see in this Noahide covenant the 
foundation of a natural law and natural rights order.58  Thereafter God entered into a 
more particular covenant with the chosen people of Israel, repeating the terms of the 
covenant to their leaders, Moses, Joshua, Hezekiah, Josiah, and Ezra.59  This covenant 
obliged every member of the community to love and care for their neighbors, to see to 
their protection and welfare, to help them achieve a good life.  As Chief Rabbi Lord 
Jonathan Sacks has written, the “fate” of a covenant community “is dependent on its 
treatment of the most vulnerable and marginal members.  Ultimately, how a society 
fares in history is dependent on its commitment to justice, to compassion, to caring for 
the poor and the widow and the orphan and the stranger.”60  The later Prophets of the 
Hebrew Bible returned to these themes repeatedly in calling the people of Israel to their 
covenant obligations.  Many later Christian scholars would use these Old Testament 
passages and their echoes in the New to defend the rights of the poor, needy, children, 
widows, orphans, and sojourners.61  
 
 The New Testament offers several strong pronouncements on freedom.  “For 
freedom, Christ has set us free.” “You were called to freedom.”  “Where the Spirit of the 
Lord is, there is freedom.”  “For the law of the Spirit of life in Christ has set [you] free 
from the law of sin and death.”  “You will know the truth, and the truth will make you 
free.”  “You will be free indeed.”  You all have been given “the law of freedom” in Christ, 
"the glorious liberty of the children of God."  You must all now “live as free men.”62  
These passages have long inspired Christians to work out the meaning and means of 
 
55 See John Witte, Jr., The Reformation of Rights: Law, Religion, and Human Rights in Early Modern 
Calvinism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007).  
56 See, e.g., Daniel J. Elazar, Covenant and Polity in Biblical Israel: Biblical Foundations and Jewish 
Expressions (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 1995); Novak, Covenantal Rights 
57 Gen. 9:1-17. 
58 See David Novak, Natural Law in Judaism (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 
1998); David VanDrunnen, Divine Covenants and Moral Order: A Biblical theology of Natural Law (Grand 
Rapids, MI: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Co., 2014).  
59 See Deuteronomy 29-31; Joshua 24; 2 Chronicles 29 and 34; 2 Kings 22-23; Nehemiah 8.   
60 Jonathan Sacks, “The Great Covenant of Liberties: Biblical Principles and Magna Carta,” in Robin 
Griffith-Jones and Mark Hill QC, eds., Magna Carta, Religion, and the Rule of Law (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2015),  ms. p. 7 
61 See, e.g., George M. Newlands and Allen P. Smith, Hospitable God: The Transformative Dream 
(Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2010); George M. Newlands, Christ and Human Rights: The Transformative 
Engagement (Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2006). 
62 Rom. 8:2, 21; John 8:32, 36, 1 Pet. 2:16. 
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attaining spiritual and political freedom.  Already in the first centuries after Christ, the 
Church Fathers and church councils used these texts as the foundation for its 
increasingly detailed canon laws that defined Christian responsibility within the church, 
and shaped its rallying cries for liberty within the state.  In later centuries, Catholic, 
Protestant, and Orthodox Christians alike turned to these biblical texts as starting points 
for their theories of rights and liberties. 
 
 The New Testament also calls for equality.  St. Paul’s manifesto to the Galatians 
famously declares: “There is neither Jew nor Greek, there is neither slave nor free, 
there is neither male nor female; for you are all one in Christ Jesus.”63  This radical 
Christian message of human equality trumped conventional Graeco-Roman hierarchies 
based on birth, nationality, social status, gender, and more.  St. Peter amplified this call 
to equality with his admonition that all Christian believers are called to be prophets, 
priests, and kings of God: "You are a chosen race, a royal priesthood, a holy nation, 
God's own people.”64  These New Testament passages were critical to the gradual 
development of the understanding of equal protection and treatment of all persons 
before the law, and to domestic and international guarantees of freedom of all from 
discrimination based on gender, race, culture, ethnicity, and social or economic status. 
 
 The New Testament was even more radical in its call to treat the “least” members 
of society with love, respect, and dignity.  Jesus took pains to minister to the social 
outcasts of his day – Samaritans, tax collectors, prostitutes, thieves, traitors, lepers, the 
lame, the blind, the adulteress, and others.65  “He who is without sin, cast the first 
stone,” he instructed a stunned crowd ready to stone a convicted adulteress.66  “Today 
you will be with me in Paradise,” he told the contrite thief nailed on the cross next to 
his.67   Even the duly convicted criminal deserves mercy and love was the point.  
Echoing the Hebrew Bible, Jesus called his followers to feed and care for the poor, 
widows, and orphans in their midst, to visit and comfort the sick, imprisoned, and 
refugee.  “Whatever you do for one of the least of these brothers of mine, you do for 
me,” he told them.68  And Jesus paid special attention to the care, nurture, and 
protection of children, and warned that it would be better to be cast in a sea with a 
millstone around one’s neck than to mislead a child.  Few texts in the day would prove 
stronger foundation for the later development of children’s rights in the Christian 
tradition.69  
 
63 Gal. 3:26-28; see also Col. 3:11, Eph. 2:14-15. 
64 I Peter 2:9; cf. Revelation 5:10, 20:6.   
65 See, e.g., Luke 10:25-37; Matthew 9:10; Luke 7:36-50; Matthew 21:31; Mark 15:27; Matthew 8:3; Mark 
2:1-12; Mark 8:22-25; John 8:1-15.  
66 John 8:7 
67 Luke 23:43 
68 Matt. 25:40 
69 See Marcia Bunge, Children in the Bible (Grand Rapids, MI: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Co., 2008); 
Marcia Bunge, ed., The Child in Christian Thought (Grand Rapids, MI: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Co., 
2001); John Witte, Jr. and Don S. Browning, “Christianity’s Mixed Contributions to Children’s Rights: 
Traditional Teachings, Modern Doubts,” 61 Emory Law Journal 991 (2011-2012), 991-1014; Symposium, 
“What’s Wrong With Rights for Children?” Emory International Law Review, 20 (2006): 1-239. 
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 Jesus and St. Paul also called believers to share their wealth, to shore up those 
in need, to give up their extra clothes and belongings even to their creditors.70  They 
even called believers to love their enemies,71 to give them food and water,72 to turn their 
cheeks to those who strike them,73 to forgo lawsuits, vengeance, and retributive 
measures,74 to be peacemakers in expression of the radical demands of Christian 
discipleship.75  Many Christians over the centuries – monks and nuns, ascetics and 
Anabaptists, missionaries and peacemakers and various others – have sought to live 
out these Christian ideals, often in highly structured Christian communities. These 
biblical passages and historical exemplars, too, provide strong foundations for the rights 
of the poor and needy in society.76  
 
 Finally, the New Testament called Christians to “render to Caesar the things that 
are Caesar’s and to God the things that are God’s”77 and reminded them that God has 
appointed “two swords”78 to rule this life, the spiritual and the temporal.  It called 
believers to “remain separate” from worldly temptations, to be “in the world, but not of 
it,” and not “conformed” to its secular ways.79  For Christians are, at heart, “strangers 
and foreigners on the earth”; their “true citizenship is in heaven.”80  The Bible also spoke 
frequently about building and rebuilding “walls” to foster this basic separation between 
believers and the outside world.  In the Hebrew Bible, these walls separated the City of 
Jerusalem from the outside world, and the temple and its priests from the commons and 
 
70 See, e.g., Mark 10:13-16; Matthew 19:13-15; Mark 7:24-30; Mark 9:14-27; John 4:46-52; Luke 8:40-
56; Matt. 18:5-9. 
71 Matt. 5:43-48. 
72 Matt. 25:31-46. 
73 Matt. 5:38-40. 
74 Matthew 5:25. 
75 Matt. 5:21-26; Rom. 12:9-21. 
76 See Tutu, “To be Human is to be Free,” (herein).  In the vast literature, see, e.g., Brian Tierney, 
Medieval Poor Law: A Sketch of Canonical Theory and its Application in England (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1959); Walter Rauschenbusch, A Theology for the Social Gospel (Louisville, KY: 
Westminster John Knox Press, 1997); Martin Luther King, Jr., A Testament of Hope: The Essential 
Writings of Martin Luther King, Jr., James M. Washington, ed., (San Francisco: Harper & Row, 1986); 
United Stated Catholic Bishops, Economic Justice for All: Pastoral Letter on Catholic Social Teaching and 
the U.S. Economy (1986), last accessed February 13, 2015, 
http://www.usccb.org/upload/economic_justice_for_all.pdf); Leo XIII, Rerum Novarum [On Capital and 
Labor], 1891; Vatican Council II, “Gaudium et Spes [Pastoral Constitution on the Church in the Modern 
World]”, 1965; Paul VI, Populorum Progressio [On the Development of Peoples], 1967; etc. The papal 
encyclicals, etc. cited above are available on the Vatican website, 
http://w2.vatican.va/content/francesco/en/encyclicals/index.html.  
77 Matt. 22:21; Mark 12:17; Luke 20:25. 
78 Luke 22:38. 
79 2 Cor. 6:17; Romans 12:2 
80 Heb. 11:13; Rom. 12:2; 2 Cor. 6:14-18; Col. 3:1; Phil. 3:20. As one second-century Christian writer 
explained, for Christians “any foreign country is a motherland, and any motherland is a foreign country.” 
See Maxwell Staniforth (trans.), Betty Radice (ed.), “The Epistle to Diognetus,” in Early Christian Writings: 
The Apostolic Fathers, (Baltimore, MD: Penguin Books, 1968), 176. 
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its people.81  In the New Testament, St. Paul spoke literally of a “wall of separation.”82  
These passages and others have inspired Christians over the centuries to develop 
dualistic theories of religion and politics, church and state – two ways, two cities, two 
powers, two swords, two kingdoms, two realms, and two institutions of religion and 
politics, of spiritual and temporal life. Today such images are captured in constitutional 
injunctions to separate church and state, and to protect the rights and autonomy of 
churches and their leadership.83  
 
 Classical Roman Law.  While the Bible provided ample inspiration for the later 
development of rights in the West, classical Roman law provided ample illustration of 
how rights worked in a sophisticated legal system.84  Both before and after the Christian 
conversion of Emperor Constantine in the fourth century CE, classical Roman jurists 
used the Latin term “ius” to identify a “right” in both its objective and subjective senses.  
(Ius also meant law or legal order more generally).  The objective sense of ius – to be in 
proper order, to perform what is right and required, “to give to each his due” (ius suum 
cuiuque tribuere) – dominated the Roman law texts.  But these texts also sometimes 
used ius subjectively, in the sense of a person having a right that could be defended 
and vindicated.  Many of the subjective rights recognized at classical Roman law 
involved property: the right to own or co-own property, the right to possess, lease, or 
use property, the right to build or prevent building on one’s land, the right to gain access 
to water, the right to be free from interference with or invasion of one’s property, the 
right or capacity to alienate property, the right to bury one’s dead, and more.  Several 
texts dealt with personal rights: the rights of testators and heirs, the rights of patrons 
and guardians, the rights of fathers and mothers over children, the rights of masters 
over slaves.  Other texts dealt with public rights: the right of an official to punish or deal 
with his subjects in a certain way, the right to delegate power, the right to appoint and 
supervise lower officials.  Others dealt with procedural rights in criminal and civil cases.  
Leading Harvard legal historian, Charles Donahue, has recently identified 191 texts on 
subjective rights in the Digest alone (one of the four books of Justinian’s sixth-century 
Corpus Iuris Civilis) and speculates that hundreds if not thousands more such texts can 
be found in other books of classical Roman law.85    
 
 The classical Roman law also referred to subjective rights using the Latin term 
“libertas,” which translates variously as liberty, freedom, privilege, or independence.  At 
its most basic level, libertas was, as Justinian put it, “the natural ability (facultas) to do 
 
81 1 Kings 3:1; Jeremiah 1:18-19, 15:19-21; Ezekiel 42:1; Nehemiah 3:1- 32, 4:15-20, 12:27-43. 
82  Eph. 2:14. 
83 See John Witte, Jr., “Facts and Fictions About the History of Separation of Church and State,” 48 
Journal of Church and State 15 (2006), 15-46. 
84 For this section, see especially the sources and discussion in Charles A. Donahue, “Ius in the 
Subjective Sense in Roman Law: Reflections on Villey and Tierney,” in Domenico Maffei, ed., A Ennio 
Cortese, 3 vols.  (Rome: Il Cigno Ed., 2001), 1:506-535; Max Kaser, Ius Gentium (Cologne: Böhlau, 
1993); id., Ausgewählte Schriften, 3 vols. (Naples: Jovene, 1976-1977); Tony Honoré, Ulpian: Pioneer of 
Human Rights, 2d ed. (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2002); C. Wirszubski, Libertas as 
a Political Idea at Rome During the Late Republic and Early Principate (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1950).  
85 Charles Donahue, “Ius in the Subjective Sense in Roman Law,” supra. 
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anything one pleases, unless it is prohibited by force or law.”86  One’s libertas at Roman 
law turned in part on one’s status in Roman society.  Men had more libertas than 
women, married women more than concubines, adults more than children, citizens 
more than non-citizens.  But each person at Roman law had a basic libertas inherent in 
his or her social status.  This included a basic right to be free from subjection or undue 
restraint or actions from others who had no right (ius) to or possessory claim (dominium) 
over them.  Think of St. Paul who claimed the libertas of a Roman citizen to be free from 
whipping or capital punishment without a hearing before the emperor who alone had 
such ultimate authority over him.87  Similarly, a wife had libertas from sexual relations 
with all others besides her husband.  A natural or adopted child had libertas from the 
discipline of all others save his or her parents and paterfamilias.  Even a slave had 
libertas from the discipline of others besides the master and his delegates.  And those 
rights could be vindicated by filing actions against the offender before a praetor, judge 
(iudex), or other authority, directly or, as was more typical for those in lower social 
stations, through a representative.   
 
 Some libertas interests recognized at Roman law were cast more generally, and 
were not necessarily conditioned on the correlative duties of others.  A good example 
was the freedom of religion guaranteed to Christians and others under the Edict of Milan 
(313) passed by Emperor Constantine.  This included “the freedom (libertas) to follow 
whatever religion each one wished”; “a public and free liberty to practice their religion or 
cult”; and a “free capacity” (facultas) to follow their own religion “and worship as befits 
the peacefulness of our times.”88   
 
 Medieval Catholicism.  While some Germanic, canonical, and penitential texts 
of the later first millennium echoed these Roman rights discussions, the rediscovery and 
new study of Roman law texts in the late eleventh century forward helped to trigger a 
renaissance of subjective rights talk in the West.  Leading medievalist, Brian Tierney, 
has shown that, already in the twelfth century, the civilians and canonists (the jurists 
who worked on the church’s laws, which were called canon laws) differentiated all 
manner of rights (iura) and liberties (libertates).89  They grounded these rights and 
liberties in the law of nature (lex naturae) or natural law (ius naturale), and associated 
them variously with a power (facultas) inhering in rational human nature, with the 
property (dominium) of a person, or the power (potestas) of an office of authority 
(officium).  The early canonists repeated and glossed many of the subjective rights and 
liberties set out in Roman law – especially the public rights and powers of rulers, the 
 
86 Justinian, Institutes, I.III. See English translation in Peter Birks and Grand McLeod, eds., Justinian’s 
Institutes (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1987).  
87 Acts 22:22-29. 
88 See Sidney Ehler and John Morrall, Church and State through the Centuries: A Collection of Historic 
Documents with Commentaries (Westminster, MD: Newman Press, 1954), 4-6, original in Lactantius, De 
Mortibus Persecutorum [c. 315], 48.2–12, ed. and trans. J. L. Creed (Oxford and New York: Clarendon 
Press, 1984), 71–73. 
89 For this section, see Brian Tierney, The Idea of Natural Rights: Studies on Natural Rights, Natural 
Law, and Church Law, 1150-1625 (Grand Rapids, MI: Wm. B. Eerdmans, 2001); see further Peter 
Landau, “Zum Ursprung des ‘Ius ad Rem’ in der Kanonistik,” in Proceedings of the Third International 
Congress of Medieval Canon Law (1971): 81-102. 
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private rights and liberties of property, and what the great canonist Gratian in ca. 1140 
called the “rights of liberty” (iura libertatis) enjoyed by persons of various stations in life 
and offices of authority.90  The canonists also began to weave these early Roman law 
texts into a whole complex latticework of what we now call rights, freedoms, powers, 
immunities, protections, and capacities for different groups and persons.91   
 
 Most important to the medieval canonists were the rights needed to protect the 
“freedom of the church” (libertas ecclesiae).  “Freedom of the Church” from civil and 
feudal control and corruption was the rallying cry of Pope Gregory VII that inspired the 
Papal Revolution of 1075 and ultimately established the church as an independent legal 
and political authority for all of Western Christendom.92  In defense of this revolution, 
medieval canonists specified in great detail the rights of the church to make its own 
laws, to maintain its own courts, to define its own doctrines and liturgies, to elect and 
remove its own clergy.  They stipulated the exemptions of church property from civil 
taxation and takings, and the right of the clergy to control and use church property 
without interference or encumbrance from secular or feudal authorities.  They 
guaranteed the immunity of the clergy from secular prosecution, military service, and 
compulsory testimony; and the rights of church entities like parishes, monasteries, 
charities, and guilds to form and dissolve, to accept and reject members, and to 
establish order and discipline.  They defined the rights of church councils and synods to 
participate in the election and discipline of bishops, abbots, and other clergy.  They 
defined the rights of the lower clergy vis-à-vis their superiors.  They defined the rights of 
the laity to worship, evangelize, maintain religious symbols, participate in the 
sacraments, travel on religious pilgrimages, and educate their children.  They defined 
the rights of the poor, widows, and needy to seek solace, succor, and sanctuary within 
the Church.  They defined the rights of husbands and wives, parents and children, 
masters and servants within the household.  They defined the (truncated) rights that 
Orthodox Christians, Jews, Muslims, and heretics had in Christian society.  These 
medieval canon law rights and liberties were enforced by a hierarchy of church courts 
and other administrative church offices, each with distinctive and complex rules of 
litigation, evidence, and judgment, and each providing the right to appeal, ultimately to 
Rome.93   
 
90 C. 16, q. 3, dictum post c. 15, as quoted in Tierney, Idea of Natural Rights, 57. 
91 See R.H. Helmholz, The Privilege Against Self-Incrimination: Its Origins and Development (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1997); James Q. Whitman, The Origins of Reasonable Doubt: Theological 
Roots of the Criminal Trial (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2008).  
92 Harold J. Berman, Law and Revolution: The Formation of the Western Legal Tradition (Cambridge, 
MA: Harvard University Press, 1983).  
93 Tierney, Idea of Natural Rights, supra.; id., Rights, Law, and Infallibility in Medieval Thought 
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 These rights formulations yielded increasingly sophisticated reflections in the 
writings not only of medieval jurists, but also of medieval theologians and philosophers.  
Distinguished Notre Dame ethicist, Jean Porter, shows in her contribution herein that 
the great thirteenth-century Dominican sage, Thomas Aquinas, embraced subjective 
rights in part, drawing together insights from Aristotle, the Church Fathers, Roman law, 
and canon law.  Aquinas did not develop a full blown theory of subjective rights, nor did 
he generally refer to someone’s right in possessory terms, or as discrete moral powers.  
Yet Porter shows that, for Aquinas, certain appeals to justice did not merely invoke an 
objective order of mutual obligations.  For Aquinas, Porter writes, a moral agent 
“possesses a general moral power for self-determining action, which she can exercise 
preemptively on the basis of some claim of right.”94  Even if Thomas’s right talk 
remained rudimentary and scattered, there were ever fuller subjective rights discussions 
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well among later medieval sages like Marsilius of Padua, John Wycliffe, Conrad 
Summenhart, Richard Fitzralph, Jean Gerson, and others.  These high and later 
medieval rights discussions were synthesized and greatly expanded in the brilliant 
writings of the Spanish jurists, theologians, and philosophers gathered at the University 
of Salamanca – Francisco de Vitoria, Fernando Vázquez, Francisco Suarez, Bartolomé 
de las Casas, and many others.95  Vitoria, in particular, made path-breaking advances in 
defending “the rights of the Indians” and others in the newly conquered Latin American 
world.96  And las Casas was a brilliant apostle for religious freedom whose writings 
influenced key figures on both sides of the Atlantic.97  
 
 The medieval canon law formulations of rights and liberties had parallels in the 
common law and civil law texts of the Middle Ages.  Particularly notable sources of 
rights were the hundreds of eleventh- to sixteenth-century treaties, concordats, charters, 
and other constitutional texts that were issued by various religious and secular 
authorities of the day.  These were often detailed – and sometimes very flowery and 
elegant – statements of the rights and liberties to be enjoyed by defined groups of 
clergy, nobles, barons, knights, urban councils, citizens, universities, guilds, fraternities, 
hospitals, orphanages, monasteries, cloisters, and others.  These charters were often 
highly localized instruments, but occasionally they applied to whole territories and 
nations.  A famous example was the Magna Carta (1215), the great charter issued by 
the English Crown at the insistence of the restive barons of England and drafted under 
the guidance of Archbishop of Canterbury, Stephen Langton.  The Magna Carta 
guaranteed that “the Church of England shall be free [libera] and shall have all her 
whole rights [iura] and liberties [libertates] inviolable.”  It also provided that all “free-men” 
[liberis hominibus] were to enjoy sundry “liberties” [libertates].  These included sundry 
rights to property, marriage, and inheritance, to freedom from undue military service, 
and to freedom to pay one’s debts and taxes from the property of one’s own choosing.  
The Magna Carta also set out various rights and powers of towns and of local justices 
and their tribunals, various rights and prerogatives of the king and of the royal courts, 
and various criminal procedural rights which, by the fourteenth century, were called the 
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“rights of due process.”98   
 
 The Magna Carta and other medieval charters of rights became important 
prototypes on which later revolutionaries would call to justify their revolts against 
arbitrary and tyrannical authorities.  Among others, early modern Protestant 
revolutionaries in France, Scotland, the Netherlands, England, and America all reached 
back to these chartered rights to justify their revolutions against tyrants, and eventually 
reached beneath these charters to the natural laws and rights and the classical and 
biblical teachings on which they were founded.99   And the Magna Carta itself provided 
the foundation for an ever expanding system of rights at Anglo-American common law.  
By the time William Blackstone sat down to write his famous Commentaries on the 
Laws of England (1765), he opened his first volume with a lengthy list of public, private, 
penal, and procedural rights taught variously by the common law, civil law, canon law, 
Roman law, natural law, and law of nations.100   
 
Early Modern Protestantism.  While “freedom of the church” was the manifesto 
of the twelfth-century Papal Revolution, “freedom of the Christian” was the manifesto of 
the sixteenth-century Protestant Reformation.  Martin Luther, Thomas Cranmer, Menno 
Simons, John Calvin, and other leading sixteenth-century reformers all began their 
Protestant movements with a call for freedom from the medieval Catholic Church – 
freedom of the individual conscience from intrusive canon laws and clerical controls, 
freedom of political officials from ecclesiastical power and privileges, freedom of the 
local clergy from central papal rule and oppressive princely controls.  "Freedom of the 
Christian" became the rallying cry of the early Reformation.  It drove theologians and 
jurists, clergy and laity, princes and peasants alike to denounce canon laws and 
ecclesiastical authorities with unprecedented alacrity, and to urge radical reforms in 
church, state, and society.  The church’s canon law books were burned.  Church courts 
were closed.  Monastic institutions were confiscated.  Endowed benefices were 
dissolved.  Church lands were seized.  Clerical privileges were stripped.  Mandatory 
celibacy was suspended.  Indulgence trafficking was condemned.  Annates to Rome 
were outlawed.  Ties to the pope were severed.  Appeals to the papal rota were barred.  
Each nation, each church, and each Christian was to be free.101  
 
 Left in such raw and radical forms, this early Protestant call for freedom was a 
recipe for lawlessness and license, as Luther learned the hard way during the Peasants’ 
Revolt of 1525.  Luther and other Protestants soon came to realize that structures of law 
and authority were essential to protecting order and peace, even as guarantees of 
liberties and rights were essential to preserving the message and momentum of the 
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Reformation.  The challenge for early Protestants was to strike new balances between 
authority and liberty, order and rights on the strength of cardinal biblical teachings.   
 
 One important Protestant contribution to the Western rights tradition was their 
effort to define the nature and authority of the family, the church, and the state vis-à-vis 
each other and their subjects.  Most Protestant Reformers regarded these three 
institutions as fundamental orders of creation, equal before God and each other, and 
vested with certain natural duties and qualities that the other authorities could not 
trespass.  Defining these institutions, and their respective offices served to check the 
natural appetite of the paterfamilias, patertheologicus, and paterpoliticus for tyranny and 
abuse.  It also helped to clarify the rights and liberties of those subject to their authority, 
and to specify the grounds on which they could protest or disobey in the event of 
chronic abuse or tyranny.102  
 
 A second major contribution was the Protestant Reformers’ habit of grounding 
rights in the duties of the Decalogue and other biblical moral teachings. The First Table 
of the Decalogue, they argued, prescribes duties of love that each person owes to God 
– to honor God and God's name, to observe the Sabbath day and to worship, to avoid 
false gods and false swearing.  The Second Table prescribes duties of love that each 
person owes to neighbors – to honor one's parents and other authorities, not to kill, not 
to commit adultery, not to steal, not to bear false witness, not to covet.  The Reformers 
cast the person's duties toward God as a set of rights that others could not obstruct – 
the right to religious exercise: the right to honor God and God's name, the right to rest 
and worship on one's Sabbath, the right to be free from false gods and false oaths.  
They cast a person's duties towards a neighbor, in turn, as the neighbor's right to have 
that duty discharged.  One person's duties not to kill, commit adultery, steal, or bear 
false witness thus gives rise to another person's rights to life, property, fidelity, and 
reputation.103   
 
 Third, the Protestant Reformation permanently broke the unity of Western 
Christendom, and introduced the foundations for the modern constitutional system of 
confessional pluralism – at the territorial, national, community, or congregational levels.  
The Lutheran Reformation territorialized the faith through the principle of cuius regio, 
eius religio (“whosever region, his religion”), established by the Religious Peace of 
Augsburg in 1555.104  Under this principle, princes or city councils were authorized to 
prescribe the appropriate forms of Lutheran or Catholic doctrine, liturgy, and education 
for their polities.  Religious dissenters were granted the right to worship privately in their 
homes or to emigrate peaceably from the polity.  After decades of bitter civil war, the 
Peace of Westphalia in 1648 extended this right to Reformed Calvinists as well, 
rendering Germany and beyond a veritable honeycomb of religious pluralism for the 
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next two centuries.105 
 
 The Anglican Reformation nationalized the faith through the famous Supremacy 
Acts and Acts of Uniformity passed by the English Parliament between 1534 and 
1559.106  Citizens of the Commonwealth of England were required to be communicants 
of the Church of England, subject to the final ecclesiastical and political authority of the 
Monarch. The Toleration Act of 1689 extended a modicum of rights to some Protestant 
dissenters.107   But it was not until the Catholic and Jewish Emancipation Acts of 1829 
and 1833 that the national merger of the Church and Commonwealth of England was 
finally formally broken, and all non-Anglicans could enjoy the full rights of citizenship.108 
 
 The Anabaptist Reformation communalized the faith by introducing what Menno 
Simons once called the Scheidingsmaurer—“the wall of separation” between the 
redeemed realm of religion and the fallen realm of the world.  Anabaptist religious 
communities were ascetically withdrawn from the world into small, self-sufficient, 
intensely democratic communities, governed internally by biblical principles of 
discipleship, simplicity, charity, and Christian obedience.  When such communities grew 
too large or too divided, they deliberately colonized themselves, eventually spreading 
the Anabaptist communities from Russia to Ireland to the furthest frontiers of North 
America.109   
 
 The Calvinist Reformation congregationalized the faith by introducing rule by a 
democratically-elected consistory of pastors, elders, and deacons.  In John Calvin's day, 
the Geneva consistory was still appointed and held broad personal and subject matter 
jurisdiction over all members of the city.  By the seventeenth century, most Calvinist 
communities in Europe and North America reduced the consistory to an elected, 
representative system of government within each church.  These consistories featured 
separation among the offices of preaching, discipline, and charity, and a fluid, dialogical 
form of religious polity and policing centered on collective worship and the 
congregational meeting.    
 
 Fourth, the Protestant Reformation broke the primacy of corporate Christianity 
and gave new emphasis to the role of the individual believer in the economy of 
salvation.  The Protestant Reformation did not invent the individual, as too many 
exuberant commentators still maintain.  But sixteenth-century Protestant reformers, 
more than their Catholic contemporaries, gave new emphasis to the (religious) rights 
and liberties of individuals at both religious law and civil law.   
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 Several factors shaped this trend. One central contribution came with the 
Anabaptist doctrine of adult baptism, which gave new emphasis to a voluntarist 
understanding of religion, as opposed to conventional notions of a birthright or 
predestined faith.  The adult individual was now called to make a conscientious choice 
to accept the faith—metaphorically, to scale the wall of separation between the fallen 
world and the realm of religion and come into the garden of religion which God 
cultivated.  Later Free Church followers converted this cardinal image into a powerful 
platform of liberty of conscience and free exercise of religion not only for Christians but 
also eventually for all peaceable religious practitioners.   
 
The Great Awakening (ca. 1720-1780) in America built on this early Anabaptist 
vision.  The various Evangelical denominations and movements that emerged from the 
Great Awakening emphasized Christian conversion, the necessary spiritual rebirth of 
each sinful individual.  On that basis, they strongly advocated the liberty of conscience 
of each individual along with the free speech and press rights and duties of the 
missionary to proselytize, both on the American frontier and abroad.  Evangelicals, 
moreover, had a high view of the Christian Bible as the infallible textbook for human 
living.  On that basis, they celebrated the use of the Bible in chapels, classrooms, 
prisons, and elsewhere. And Evangelicals emphasized sanctification, the process of 
each individual becoming holier before God, neighbor, and self.  On that basis, they 
underscored a robust ethic of spiritual and moral progress, education, and improvement 
of all. These views eventually had a great influence on the formation of constitutional 
protections of religious liberty in eighteenth- and nineteenth-century America.  
 
 Calvinist Reformers set out an ever more expansive theory and law of individual 
rights.  Many early Calvinist leaders were trained in both theology and law, and they 
talked as freely about subjective rights as lawyers did.  Calvin, for example, spoke about 
the “the common rights of mankind” (iura commune hominum), the “natural rights” (iura 
naturali) of persons, the “rights of a common nature,” (communis naturae iura), or the 
“the equal rights and liberties” (pari iura et libertates) of all.110 Half a century later, 
Calvinist jurist Johannes Althusius laid out a comprehensive system of what he called 
spiritual or religious rights and liberties (iura et libertates religionis); and (2) temporal or 
civil rights and liberties (iura et libertates civile), drawn variously from the Bible, the 
Talmud, Roman law, the medieval ius commune, and the Spanish neo-scholastics in 
Salamanca.111   In 1641, New England jurist and theologian, Nathaniel Ward, drew all 
these insights together in a 6,200-word Body of Liberties for the new colony of 
Massachusetts Bay.112  
 
 Early modern Calvinists also grounded these rights in the signature Protestant 
teaching first made famous by Luther, that every person is both saint and sinner (simul 
iustus et peccator).113  On the one hand, they argued, a person is created in the image 
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of God and justified by faith in God.  The person is called to a distinct vocation, which 
stands equal in dignity and sanctity to all others.  The person is prophet, priest, and 
king, and responsible to exhort, minister, and rule in the community.  Each person, 
therefore, stands individually and equally before God.  Each person is vested with a 
natural liberty to live, to believe, and to serve God and neighbor.  Each person is 
entitled to the vernacular Scripture, to education, and to work in a vocation.  On the 
other hand, human beings are sinful and prone to evil and egoism. All persons need the 
restraint of the law to deter them from evil and to drive them to repentance.  All persons 
need the natural association of others to exhort, minister, and rule them with law and 
with love. All persons, therefore, are inherently communal creatures, symbiotically 
bonded with families, churches, and political communities. 
 
 These Protestant teachings helped to inspire many of the early modern 
revolutions fought in the name of human rights and democracy.114  They were the 
driving ideological forces behind the revolts of the French Huguenots, Dutch Pietists, 
and Scottish Presbyterians against their monarchical oppressors in the later sixteenth 
and seventeenth centuries.  They were critical weapons in the arsenal of the 
revolutionaries in England, America, and France.  They were important sources of the 
great age of democratic construction in later eighteenth and nineteenth-century America 
and Western Europe.115   
 
Enlightenment Reforms.  While medieval Catholics grounded rights in natural 
law and ancient charters, and while early modern Protestants grounded them in biblical 
texts and theological anthropology, Enlightenment writers in Europe and North America 
grounded rights in human nature and the social contract.  Building in part on the ancient 
ideas of Cicero, Seneca, and other Stoics of a pre-political state of nature, as well as on 
Calvinist ideas of covenant community, John Locke, Jean Jacques Rousseau, Thomas 
Jefferson, and others argued for a new contractarian theory of human rights and 
political order.  Each individual person, they argued, was created equal in virtue and 
dignity, and vested with inherent and unalienable rights of life, liberty, and property.  
Each person was naturally capable of choosing his or her own means and measures of 
happiness without necessary external references or divine commandments.  In their 
natural state, or in “the state of nature,” all persons were free to exercise their natural 
rights fully.  But life in this state of nature was at minimum “inconvenient,” as Locke put 
it – if not “brutish, nasty, and short,” as Thomas Hobbes put it.  For there was no means 
to balance and broker disputes between one person’s rights against all others, no 
incentive to invest or create property or conclude contracts when one’s title was not 
sure, no mechanism for dealing with the needs of children, the weak, the disabled, the 
vulnerable.  As a consequence, rational persons chose to move from the state of nature 
into societies with stable governments.  They did so by entering into social contracts 
and ratifying constitutions to govern their newly created societies.  By these 
instruments, persons agreed to sacrifice or limit some of their natural rights for the sake 
of creating a measure of social order and peace.  They also agreed to delegate their 
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natural rights of self-rule to elected officials who would represent and exercise 
executive, legislative, and judicial authority on their behalf.  But, at the same time, these 
social and political contracts enumerated the various “inalienable” rights that all persons 
were to enjoy without derogation, and the conditions of “due process of law” under 
which “alienable” rights could be abridged or taken away.  And these contracts also 
stipulated the right of the people to elect and change their representatives in 
government, and to be tried in all cases by a jury of their peers.  
 
 These new Enlightenment views helped shape the American and French 
constitutions, in particular.  The Virginia Declaration of Rights (1776), for example, 
provided in Article I: “That all men are by nature equally free and independent, and have 
certain inherent rights, of which, when they enter into a state of society, they cannot, by 
any compact, deprive or divest their posterity; namely, the enjoyment of life and liberty, 
with the means of acquiring and possessing property, and pursuing and obtaining 
happiness and safety.” The Declaration went on to specify the rights of the people to 
vote and to run for office, their “indubitable, unalienable, and indefeasible right to 
reform, alter or abolish” their government if necessary, various traditional criminal 
procedural protections, the right to jury trial in civil and criminal cases, freedom of press, 
and various freedoms of religion.  But the Declaration also reflected traditional Christian 
sentiments in Articles 15 and 16: “[N]o free government, or the blessings of liberty, can 
be preserved to any people but by a firm adherence to justice, moderation, temperance, 
frugality, and virtue and by frequent recurrence to fundamental principles.”  And “it is the 
mutual duty of all to practice Christian forbearance, love, and charity towards each 
other.”116 In this formulation, subjective rights were qualified and complemented by 
traditional moral virtues and duties. Even stronger such qualifications stood alongside 
new Enlightenment views in the 1780 Massachusetts Constitution and in other New 
England state constitutions.117  
 
 The 1791 Bill of Rights, amended to the 1787 United States Constitution, 
provided a new set of rights of national citizenship to be enforced by the new federal 
courts.  While the Constitution itself had spoken generically of the “blessings of liberty” 
and specified a few discrete “privileges and immunities” in Articles I and IV, it was left to 
the Bill of Rights to enumerate the rights of American citizens.  The Bill of Rights 
guaranteed the freedoms of religion, speech, assembly, and press, the right to bear 
arms, freedom from forced quartering of soldiers, freedom from illegal searches and 
seizures, various criminal procedural protections, the right to jury trial in civil cases, the 
guarantee not to be to be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, 
and the right not to have private property taken for public use without just 
compensation.  This original Bill of Rights was later augmented by several other 
amendments, the most important of which were the right to be free from slavery, the 
right to equal protection and due process of law, and the right for all adults, male and 
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female, to vote.118  The Bill of Rights was defended in its day on a variety of grounds – 
with Enlightenment arguments among the most well-known today.  But it is no small 
commentary for this symposium that, by 1650, every one of these guarantees in the 
United States Bill of Rights had already been defined, defended, and died for by 
Christian writers – Catholics and Protestants on both sides of the Atlantic.  
 
 Enlightenment arguments proved more singularly decisive in shaping the French 
Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen (1791).  This signature instrument, which 
revolutionized a good deal of Western Europe, enumerated various “natural, 
unalienable, and sacred rights,” including liberty, property, security, and resistance to 
oppression, “the freedom to do everything which injures no one else,” the right to 
participate in the foundation and formulation of law, a guarantee that all citizens are 
equal before the law and equally eligible to all dignities and to all public positions and 
occupations, according to their abilities.  The Declaration also included basic criminal 
procedural protections, freedom of (religious) opinions, freedoms of speech and press, 
and rights to property.119  Both the French and American constitutions and declarations 
were essential prototypes for a whole raft of constitutional and international documents 
on rights that were forged in the next two centuries.  
 
 
The Challenges of Christianity and Human Rights  
  
 The development and refinement of human rights norms in national and 
international law have made “rights” the dominant mode of political, legal, and moral 
discourse in the modern West and beyond.  Rights protections and violations are 
increasingly prominent issues in international relations and diplomacy.  Most nation-
states now have detailed bills or recitations of rights in their constitutions, statutes, and 
cases.  The United Nations and various other groups of nation-states have detailed 
catalogues of rights set out in treaties, declarations, conventions, and covenants.  Many 
Christian denominations and ecumenical groups, alongside other religious groups, have 
their own declarations and statements on rights as well and have been instrumental in 
the development of the major international human rights instruments.120  Thousands of 
governmental, intergovernmental, and non-governmental organizations are now 
dedicated to the defense of rights around the world, including a large number of 
Christian and other religious lobbying and litigation groups. But, should “rights talk” be 
such a dominant moral and legal language among Christians today?  Do the ideas and 
institutions underlying today’s human rights paradigms adequately express the values – 
and meet the needs – of the modern world and its peoples?    
 
 Mapping the Challenges.  Several Christian scholars have argued that the 
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language of rights, though not entirely foreign to Christianity, is, in its modern forms, 
inconsistent with Christian faith and practice.  In his contribution to this symposium, 
leading Christian ethicist Stanley Hauerwas argues that rights are conceptually and 
practically inadequate.121 Hauerwas acknowledges that “the appeal to rights has been a 
means to protect those who have no protection in the world in which we find ourselves.” 
He further recognizes that such appeals have “provided for many a moral identity 
otherwise unavailable.” Yet Hauerwas worries that reflexive and repeated “appeals to 
rights” “threaten to replace first order moral descriptions in a manner that makes us less 
able to make the moral discriminations that we depend upon to be morally wise.”122 For 
example, “If you need a theory of rights to know that torture is morally wrong,” 
Hauerwas writes, “then something has clearly gone wrong with your moral 
sensibilities.”123  
 
 Hauerwas seems most troubled by rights that entitle individuals to choose and 
act in socially unbounded ways. The right and freedom “to do everything which injures 
no one else,” as the French revolutionaries put it in the 1791 Declaration of the Rights of 
Man and Citizen, is at once too abstract and too diffuse to sustain the requisite moral 
commitments and judgments implicit in the recognition that all persons share a common 
humanity. “No real society can exist when its citizens’ only way of relating is in terms of 
noninterference” with one another.124 Quoting Simone Weil, he adds: 
 
the right to choose divorced from the rules that make life 
together possible can result in the loss of the enjoyment 
liberty should provide. That loss means people “must either 
seek refuge in irresponsibility, puerility, and indifference—a 
refuge where the most they can find is boredom—or feel 
themselves weighted down by the responsibility at all times 
for fear of causing harm to others.”125 
  
 Hauerwas only hints here at the rich eschatological vision of Christian community 
and moral virtue that he has developed in several other writings.  Here, he simply notes 
that rights have a contingent and milquetoast character when placed alongside the 
stronger moral norms and narratives that are at the heart of Christian teachings.  Rights, 
he says, may aptly describe a vendor’s legal capacity to sell goods, or a bank’s ability to 
make a loan.  But much more is needed to convey the gravity of the wrongs of, say, 
child prostitution, rape, or murder, or the seriousness of the commands to love God, 
neighbor, and self.  Rights claims inevitably reflect a tone of envy, of grasping, of self-
promotion. They thus have only a “mediocre character,” reflecting a “vocabulary of 
middle values” that are simply too weak to account for gross injustices or the serious 
commands of faith, hope and love.  Concepts like “truth, beauty, justice, and 
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compassion” are the stronger and sterner concepts we need for the serious moral and 
social issues that any community regularly faces.126  While rights may depend on or 
refer to deeper moral values and relationships, reflexive appeals to rights are more 
likely to eclipse engagement with the moral dimensions of social life and replace them 
with a “shrill nagging of claims and counter-claims, which is both impure and 
unpractical.”127 Thus, even if rights can play a legitimate role in legal spheres, rights are 
not morally basic or absolute, and distract us from morality.  Rights might be “reminder 
claims to help us remember the thick moral relationships” that become the Christian 
life.128  But Christians would do well to jettison rights from their moral vocabularies per 
se for fear of cheapening their moral discourse, or thinning their moral character.129  
 
 Distinguished Christian jurist, Patrick Parkinson cautions against human rights 
not because they are morally thin, but because they are morally thick.  In his native 
Australia, Parkinson argues, human rights norms come laden with thick liberal values 
that too often conflict with the religious and moral teachings of Christian churches and 
other religious institutions.  To accept a human rights regime is to risk capitulation to 
these liberal values, he argues.  Several Christian leaders in Australia have thus spoken 
out against adding a bill of rights to the Australian constitution, which is the only 
Western constitution without a bill of rights.  Australian Christians worry that evolving 
cultural norms, together with untested provisions about gender and same-sex 
discrimination, will jeopardize churches in their ability to select their own clergy and 
teachers, or to enforce traditional moral and religious norms among their memberships.  
They worry further that those advocating human rights in Australia “do not take freedom 
of religion and conscience nearly seriously enough.”130 Other common law lands, 
Parkinson and others point out, are now facing a sustained argument that religion has 
no special claim to human rights, and that religious freedom, if protected at all, must 
take second place to other fundamental human rights claims in the event of conflict.131  
  
This subordination of religious freedom to other fundamental rights claims is what 
concerns leading Catholic legal scholar Helen Alvare in her contribution to this 
symposium.  Alvare is particularly concerned that norms of sexual liberty, privacy, and 
autonomy are threatening to eclipse religious liberty in the United States.  Already in the 
ur case of Griswold v. Connecticut (1965),132 she argues, the United States Supreme 
Court affirmed the right of married heterosexual couples to have access to 
contraceptives owing, in part, to the deeply “private” nature of marital relationships and 
the decision of married couples to procreate.  In subsequent cases, the Court expanded 
these privacy rights to unmarried individuals, entitling them to make private decisions 
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about their own sexual relationships, including the gender of their sexual partner(s), and 
the use of birth control and abortion as contraceptive methods.  This resulting sphere of 
constitutionally-protected privacy, Alvare argues, has gradually come into conflict with 
First Amendment’s religious liberty norms.  When the law mandates pharmacists or 
employers to participate in the delivery of contraceptives, or prohibits religious 
employers from regulating the sexual morality of their employees, or insists that 
photographers or bakers service the weddings of same-sex couples – this has a direct 
and dramatic impact on Roman Catholic institutions and individuals who adhere to the 
Church’s official teachings about contraception, abortion, marriage, and sexual 
expression. These teachings are so deeply bound to Catholic cosmology, Alvare 
argues, that “coercing Catholics to facilitate opposing practices is tantamount to 
coercing them to abandon their own religion and to practice another.”133  
 
 Leading Black Church and African-American studies expert Robert Franklin 
warns in his contribution to this symposium that the American human rights movement 
is increasingly passing by the very African-American communities that were so vital in 
building the case for the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Voting Rights Act of 1965.134  
These two acts ostensibly put an end to the “separate but equal” legal status of racial 
minorities in the United States, he argues.  But, despite the formal equality mandated by 
these acts, recent studies show startling disparities in America’s criminal justice system.  
African-American men make up a disproportionate share of the total prison population in 
the United States, which ballooned from fewer than 350,000 in 1972 to more than 2.2 
million today. African Americans make up only 12 percent of the overall population, but 
constitute 37 percent of all inmates.135  Roughly one-third of all African American men 
are currently under the control of state or federal prison systems – either in prison or jail, 
on probation, or on parole.136  
 
 Researchers debate the underlying causes of criminal behavior, and the political 
motivations behind American law enforcement policies such as the “war on drugs,” 
which has led to increased rates of arrest and incarceration.137  A growing number of 
scholars, however, see troubling similarities between the modern criminal justice system 
and the “Jim Crow” laws in place prior to the civil rights era.  These scholars point out 
apparent racial biases and dubious practices affecting the enforcement and adjudication 
of drug-related and other criminal laws.138 They also point out the increasing scope of 
“collateral consequences” that are often attached to criminal convictions, including 
“disenfranchisement, loss of professional licenses, and deportation in the case of aliens, 
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as well as newer penalties such as felon registration and ineligibility for certain public 
welfare benefits.”139 The disproportionate incarceration and disenfranchisement of racial 
minorities, and the substantial barriers imposed by the criminal justice system to their 
rehabilitation and re-entry into their communities have dire implications for racial 
equality and for the long-term wellbeing of the nation as a whole. There are serious 
rights claims at stake when criminal penalties contribute to, rather than mitigate, the 
breakdown of families and other community structures. These issues deserve the 
sustained attention of, among others, Christian scholars who are interested in fostering 
a just legal and social order.  
 
 Not only racial minorities in the United States, but also religious minorities around 
the world are facing increasing oppression and persecution, even as human rights 
instruments in favor of their protection have become increasingly detailed and more 
prominent in international diplomacy and news coverage. A 2009 comprehensive study 
documents that more than a third of the 198 countries and self-administering territories 
in the world today have “high” or “very high” levels of religious oppression, sometimes 
exacerbated by civil war, natural disasters, and foreign invasion that have caused 
massive humanitarian crises.  The countries on this dishonor roll include Iran, Iraq, 
India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Indonesia, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, Yemen, 
Sudan, Egypt, Israel, Burma, Rwanda, Burundi, the Congo, Chechnya, Uzbekistan, 
among others.140  The most recent annual report of the U.S. Commission on 
International Religious Freedom confirms the precarious status of religious minorities in 
many parts of the world, now exacerbated by the rise of ISIS in the Middle East and the 
escalating oppression of Muslim and Christian minorities in various parts of the world, 
including Western lands.141  Western readers may be surprised to learn that Christians 
are among the most persecuted religious groups around the world today.  A 2014 study 
found that Christians were more widely harassed than the members of any other 
religious tradition, experiencing social and political hostility in at least 110 countries.142 
These hostilities were carried out by a variety of private groups and governmental 
entities, and included arrests and detentions, desecration of holy sites, denial of visas, 
corporate charters, and entity status, and discrimination in employment, education and 
housing, closures of worship centers, schools, charities, cemeteries, and religious 
services – let alone outright rape, torture, kidnapping, and slaughter of religious 
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believers in alarming numbers of war-torn areas of the Middle East and Africa.143  Even 
while some Western Christians rest comfortably on their tenured rights and liberties and 
now question the theological validity, moral value, or even social utility of rights, many 
Christians and other religious believers have become increasingly desperate to secure 
the most basic of human rights protections.   
 
Facing the Challenges.  We submit that rights should remain part of Christian 
moral, legal, and political discourse, and that Christians should remain part of broader 
public debates about human rights and public advocacy for their more expansive 
protection and implementation.  We agree with those Christian skeptics today who 
criticize the utopian idealism of some modern rights advocates, the reduction of rights 
claims to groundless and self-interested wish lists, the monopoly of rights language in 
public debates about morality and law, and the dominant liberalism of much 
contemporary rights talk.  We also recognize that Christian believers and churches will 
inevitably vary in their approaches to human rights – from active involvement in 
litigation, lobbying, and legislation to quiet provision for the poor, needy, and strangers 
in their midst.  In the church, the Bible reminds us, “[t]here are varieties of gifts, but the 
same Spirit; and there are varieties of service, but the same Lord.”144   
 
We further acknowledge that some rights recognized today are more congenial 
to Scripture, tradition, and Christian experience than others.  In the introduction to this 
Article we highlighted nine common classes of rights – subjective and objective rights; 
natural and positive rights; public and private rights; individual and group rights; 
substantive and procedural rights; human and civil rights; unalienable and alienable 
rights; will theory and interest-based rights; first generation civil and political rights, 
second generation social, cultural, and economic rights, third generation rights to peace, 
order, and environmental protection.  We also drew out four jural relationships that cut 
across these types of rights – rights and privileges, active and passive rights, privileges 
and immunities, positive and negative rights and liberties.  Most of these rights 
classifications, and others, we have shown in our historical overview, were drawn by 
Christian jurists, moralists, and philosophers from the fourth to the eighteenth centuries.  
And these rights were – and still are – applied to different areas of law and life.  Family 
laws, for example, protect the reciprocal rights and duties of spouses, parents, and 
children at different stages of the life cycle.  Social welfare rights speak to the basic 
human need for food, shelter, health care, and education – especially for vulnerable 
populations. Free speech and free press laws protect the rights of persons to speak, 
preach, and publish.  Private and public laws protect the person’s rights to contractual 
performance, to property and inheritance, to the safety and integrity of their bodies, 
relationships, and reputations, along with the procedural means to vindicate these rights 
when they are threatened or breached by another. Criminal procedural rights are 
designed to ensure an individual of proper forms of arrest and detention, fair hearings 
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and trails, and of just punishments that are proportionate to specific crimes. Freedom of 
conscience and the free exercise of religion protect the essential right (and duty) of 
Christians to love God, neighbor, and self.   
 
 When Christians affirm such rights – in defense of themselves or others – they 
need not abandon their religious and moral traditions, much less defy their duty to love 
God “with all your heart, and with all your soul, and with all your strength, and with all 
your mind; and your neighbor as yourself.”145  Stanley Hauerwas is right to warn that 
rights can become a grammar of greed and grasping, of self-promotion and self-
aggrandizement at the cost of one’s neighbor and one’s relationship to God.  But 
Christians from the start have claimed their rights and freedoms first and foremost in 
order to discharge the moral duties of the faith.  Claiming your right to worship God, to 
avoid false gods, to observe the Sabbath Day, and to use God’s name properly enables 
you to discharge the duties of love owed to God under the First Table of the Decalogue.  
Claiming your rights to life, property, and reputation, or to the integrity of your marriage, 
family, and household gives your neighbor the chance to honor the duties of love in the 
Second Table of the Decalogue – to not murder, steal, or bear false witness; to not 
dishonor parents or breach marital vows; to not covet, threaten, or violate “anything that 
is your neighbor’s.”146  To insist on these Second Table rights can also be an act of love 
towards your neighbors, giving them the opportunity and accountability necessary to 
learn and discharge their moral duties.   
 
Once viewed this way, many rights claims are not selfish grasping at all – even if 
they happen to serve one’s own interests.  Rights claims can reflect and embody love of 
God and neighbor.  The rights claims of the poor and needy, the widow and the orphan, 
the child and the stranger, and the “least” of society are, in part, invitations for others to 
serve God and neighbor: “As you did it to one of the least of these…you did it to me,” 
Jesus said.147  To insist on the rights of self-defense and the protection and integrity of 
your body or that of your loved ones, or to bring private claims and support public 
prosecution of those who rape, batter, starve, abuse, torture, or kidnap you or your 
loved ones is, in part, an invitation for others to respect the divine image and “temple of 
the Lord” that each person embodies.148 To insist on the right to education and training, 
and the right to work and earn a fair wage is, in part, an invitation for others to respect 
God’s call to each of us to prepare for and pursue our distinctive vocation.149  To sue for 
contractual performance, to claim a rightful inheritance, to collect on a debt or insurance 
claim, to bring an action for discrimination or wrongful discharge from a job serves, in 
part, to help others to live out the Golden Rule – to do unto others as you would have 
them do unto you.150  To petition the government for your due process and equal 
protection rights; to seek compensation for unjust taxes or unlawful takings or searches 
of your property; to protest governmental abuse, deprivation, persecution, or violence -- 
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all these are, in part, calls for political officers to live up to the lofty ideals that the Bible 
ascribes to the political office.  To sue for protection of your freedoms of speech and 
press or your rights to vote are, in part, a call for others to respect God’s generous 
calling for each of us to serve as a prophet, priest, and king on this earth.151 And to 
insist on your freedom of conscience and free exercise of religion is to force others to 
respect the prerogatives of God, whose loving relationship with his children cannot be 
trespassed by any person or institution.  
 
 These examples, and many others, demonstrate that human rights are not 
inherently antithetical to Christianity.  They are part of the daily currency of life, law, and 
love in this earthly realm, damaged and distorted as it inevitably is.  Rights and their 
vindication help the law achieve its basic “uses” in this life – the “civil use” of keeping 
peace, order, and constraint among its citizens even if by force; the “theological use” of 
driving a person to reflect on their failings and turn to better ways of living in community; 
and the “educational use” of teaching everyone the good works of morality and love that 
please God, however imperfect and transient that achievement will inevitably be in the 
present age.152 
 
 To have and use rights in a fallen world does not mean that Christians must 
always pursue those rights to their furthest reaches.  Just as judges must apply the law 
equitably, so Christians (and others) must pursue lawful rights claims equitably. 
Christians are often called to turn the other cheek,153 to forgive debtors,154 to love 
enemies,155 and to settle disputes privately.156 Such acts of faith can serve important 
theological and educational “uses” of their own, even without directly engaging the civil 
law. To love a debtor, defendant, or adversary in such ways is, in part, to “heap burning 
coals upon his head,”157 to induce him to respect his neighbor’s person and property, 
and to urge him to reform his actions. To forgive an egregious felon – as Pope John 
Paul II forgave his would-be assassin,158 or as the Amish forgave those who murdered 
their school children159 – is to echo and embody a form of self-sacrifice at the heart of 
Christian faith.160  But such acts of faith are atypical precisely because they are 
exceptions to the usual rules of an earthly order in which laws must be enforced if they 
are to be effective, and in which rights must be vindicated for the law to fulfill its 
appropriate civil uses and maintain a basic level of peace and order. 
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 To say that rights are useful within the state and civil society is not necessarily to 
recommend the same set or reach of rights within the church.  The state is a universal 
sovereign; the church is more limited in its membership and reach. The state has 
ultimate coercive power over life and limb; the church has only spiritual power over its 
members.  The state’s authority is inescapable for those who live within its borders; the 
church’s authority rests on voluntary membership.  Against the state, rights and liberties 
have emerged as powerful ways to protect the dignity of individuals, and the integrity of 
social institutions, from the totalitarian tendencies of those who command political 
authority.  Within the state, rights and liberties have also emerged as an expedient 
means for citizens and institutions to establish boundaries and bonds with their 
neighbors, to protect and preserve their property and promises, to negotiate and 
peaceably litigate their differences, and more.  Here, rights are common and useful 
instruments for social order, peace, and predictability.  By contrast, churches operate by 
different means and measures of fellowship, different norms of keeping order and 
peace, and different models of authority and submission, love and sacrifice, caring and 
sharing.  Canon law and ecclesiastical structures have some basic rules and rights that 
are comparable to those of the state. After all, churches are legal entities that deal, in 
part, in contracts and property, labor and employment, incorporation and procedures for 
their leadership and members. But rights are a less central means by which believers 
typically relate to one another in spiritual fellowship.  
 
 Finally, to say that human rights are useful and important is not to say that rights 
constitute a freestanding system of morality, or render Christian moral and religious 
teachings superfluous. Some contemporary scholars describe human rights as the new 
religion and catechism of modern liberalism, invented in the Enlightenment to replace 
tried and tired Christian establishments. Indeed, core human rights can take on near-
sacred qualities in modern societies. Moreover, ideals like “liberty, equality, and 
fraternity,” or “life, liberty, and property,” or “due process and equal protection of the 
law” often function as powerful normative totems. Yet modern human rights norms are 
better understood as the ius gentium of our times – the common law of nations – which 
a variety of Jewish, Greek, Roman, Patristic, Catholic, Protestant, and Enlightenment 
movements have historically nurtured in the West, and which today still needs the 
constant nurture of multiple communities, in the West and beyond.  Many formulations 
of human rights are suffused with the fundamental beliefs and values of modern 
liberalism, some of which run counter to the cardinal beliefs of various religious 
traditions, including Christianity.  But secular political philosophy does not and should 
not have a monopoly on the nurture of human rights; indeed, a human rights regime 
cannot long survive under its exclusive patronage.  For human rights are "middle 
axioms" of political discourse.161  They are a means to the ends of justice and the 
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common good. But, the norms that rights instantiate depend upon the visions and 
values of human communities for their content and coherence – or, what the Catholic 
philosopher Jacques Maritain described as “the scale of values governing [their] 
exercise and concrete manifestation.”162   
 
It is here that Christianity and other religious communities play a vital role – even 
in modern liberal societies. Religion is a dynamic and diverse, but ultimately 
ineradicable, condition and form of human community.  Religions invariably provide 
some of the sources and “scales of values” by which many persons and communities 
govern themselves.  Religions help to define the meanings and measures of shame and 
regret, restraint and respect, responsibility and restitution that a human rights regime 
presupposes.  They help to lay out the fundamentals of human dignity and human 
community, and the essentials of human nature and human needs upon which rights 
are built.  Moreover, Christianity and other religions stand alongside the state and other 
institutions in helping to implement and protect the rights of a community – especially in 
transitional societies, or at times when a once-stable state becomes weak, distracted, 
divided, or cash-strapped.  Churches and other religious communities can create the 
conditions (sometimes the prototypes) for the realization of first generation civil and 
political rights of speech, press, assembly, and more.  They can provide a critical 
(sometimes the principal) means to meet second generation rights of education, health 
care, child care, labor organizations, employment, artistic opportunities, among others.  
And they can offer some of the deepest insights into norms of creation, stewardship, 
and servanthood that lie at the heart of third generation rights. 
 
Because of the vital role of religion in the cultivation and implementation of 
human rights, many social scientists and human rights scholars have come to see that 
providing strong protections for religious individuals and religious institutions enhances, 
rather than diminishes, human rights for all.  Already a century ago, German jurist 
Georg Jellinek wrote that religious freedom is “the mother of many other rights.”163   
Many other scholars now repeat the American founders’ declaration that religious 
freedom is “the first freedom” from which other rights and freedoms evolve.  For the 
religious individual, the right to believe leads ineluctably to the rights to assemble, 
speak, worship, evangelize, educate, parent, travel, or to abstain from the same on the 
basis of one’s beliefs. For the religious association, the right to exist implies the rights to 
corporate property, collective worship, organized charity, parochial education, freedom 
of press, and autonomy of governance.  Several comprehensive studies of the state of 
religious freedom in the world today have shown that proper protection of “religious 
freedom in a country is strongly associated with other freedoms, including civil and 
political liberty, press freedom, and economic freedom, as well as with multiple 
measures of well-being…. [W]herever religious freedom is high, there tend to be fewer 
incidents of armed conflict, better health outcomes, higher levels of earned income, 
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prolonged democracy and better educational opportunities for women.”164  
Liberal philosophers, in turn, have come to realize that religion often plays a key 
role in public life and political deliberation.  A generation ago, secularization, 
privatization, and disestablishment theorists commonly insisted that religion had no 
serious place in public life, and that political deliberation required secular or utilitarian 
rationality to be valid.  Many asserted that religion could be consigned to the private 
sphere where it would slowly but inevitably die out, having outlived its utility.  Some 
scholars have maintained these positions. The subsequent growth and transformations 
of religions around the world, however, have led many others to question the central 
hypotheses of secularization theory, to reimagine the place of religion in political 
processes, and to invite people of faith back to the table of public deliberation. Pluralism 
now outshines strict secularism as a discursive ideal for modern democracies.  
Even some of the most influential proponents of religious privatization have 
accordingly retracted their previous calls to exclude religious norms and idioms from 
legislative and political discourse. Jürgen Habermas, Richard Rorty, and John Rawls, 
for example, have all affirmed in their later writings that religion can play valuable and 
legitimate roles in the lawmaking processes of liberal democracies.165 They 
acknowledge that deeply held beliefs are not easily bracketed; that efforts to exclude an 
entire class of moral and metaphysical knowledge is more likely to yield mutual distrust 
and hostility than social accord; that free speech norms prohibit banning or 
discriminating against religion in the public square; and that avowedly secular values 
are not inherently more objective, in an epistemological sense, than their religious 
counterparts. Secular norms and idioms can serve as useful discursive resources in 
religiously pluralistic societies. But purging religion altogether from public life is 
impractical, short-sighted, and often unjust.  
 Leading Jewish philosopher, Lenn E. Goodman, offers a viable alternative to the 
“naked public square” arguments of a generation or two ago.166 Goodman argues that 
social and communal bonds are forged through authentic encounters with the genuine 
other. Moral truth and political justice are best approximated when persons bring their 
best arguments, their deepest convictions, and a sense of mutual respect for one 
another to the conversation table. He offers “a simple thesis: that we humans, with all 
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our differences in outlook and tradition, can respect one another and learn from one 
another’s ways, without sharing them or relinquishing the commitments we make our 
own.”167 With this in mind, Goodman urges that members of pluralistic societies should 
not censor themselves, privatize or gloss over their differences, or naively romanticize 
the exotic other while showing contempt for the more-familiar domestic other. Nor 
should persons or groups foist sectarian parochialisms on their unreceptive neighbors. 
Instead, members of pluralistic societies ought to mine their respective moral traditions 
– including religious and secular moral traditions – for wisdom and insights about how to 
live together with integrity. “The profit of pluralism,” Goodman contends, “is the space it 
allows for individuals and groups to retain their identity and commitments, not blurring 
the differences that make all the difference or blunting the seriousness that 
distinguishes high seriousness from mere entertainment.…  [F]ruitful dialogue demands 
our knowing something about who we are ourselves, what we believe and care about, 
and how what is other actually is other.”168 
 
 Thus, for Goodman, discerning the proper scope and substance of moral and 
legal norms is anything but an abstract thought experiment conducted behind a 
hypothetical “veil of ignorance.”  Rather, it is a real, historical process – an actual 
debate among actual people who have actual lives and actual beliefs, hopes, fears, 
plans and needs. “[T]he kind of pluralism I advocate finds its ideal in an ongoing 
conversation among cultures in all their richness and among individuals in all their 
uniqueness.” When it’s done right, such pluralism sharpens a society’s values like a 
whetstone sharpens a blade. “[I]t is in our big ideas,” Goodman explains, “that we 
humans find ways of integrating thoughts with acts and find structural affinities that may 
help us link our local truths to one another. The logic of our commitments stands in relief 
as the family resemblances in our diverse ways of thought and action come into 
focus.”169  Such discourse ideally allows religiously diverse persons and groups to learn 
and evaluate the contours – and limits – of their own moral teachings. Different 
communities discover which values they hold in common, and which they do not, by 
exhibiting to one another what they actually believe – not by imagining which values 
they might hold if they didn’t know who they were. In short, the pursuit of justice, both as 
a concept and as an institutional reality, requires candid and thoroughgoing debates 
within and between moral communities. “A good government will foster religious thought 
and expression and promote metaphysical conversation and inquiry, not hide behind a 
factitious or fictitious scrim of value neutrality.”170 Following Goodman, an appropriate 
posture for Christian scholars working in pluralistic contexts is one of integrity and 
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reciprocity, boldness and humility.  In the spirit of Saint Francis of Assisi, Christian 
scholars should seek not only to be understood by their non-Christian counterparts, but 
also to understand and empathize with them.  
 
 In order to assume their proper place in public deliberation, political law-making, 
and human rights cultivation, however, Christian believers and churches must embody 
and exemplify the rights and duties they extol and advocate.  Like other institutions, 
Christian churches are not immune to the vices of their members and leaders. Yet the 
gross injustices, negligence, and abuses that infect too many Christian institutions today 
are inexcusable in light of the divine truths and moral ideals they confess. Think of the 
clerical abuse of minors. The embezzlement of tithes and gifts. The degradation and 
mistreatment of women. Indifference to the poor and needy.  A lack of compassion in 
matters of sexual orientation. Racially and economically segregated congregations. 
Inhospitality toward immigrants and foreigners. Wrath. Greed. Sloth. Pride. Lust. Envy. 
Gluttony. “Therefore you have no excuse…whoever you are, when you judge others,” 
the Bible tells us; “for in passing judgment on [another] you condemn yourself, because 
you, the judge, are doing the very same things.”171 Our failure as Christians to live up to 
our own truths and values rightly undercuts our moral authority in the eyes of others.  
Only by embracing and embodying the truths and values we profess can Christians 
retain the ability to call out injustices in other social spheres and institutions. Christian 
communities simply must do more to habitualize, institutionalize, and exemplify respect 
for basic human rights, especially the rights of vulnerable populations within their midst.  
 
 Martin Luther King, Jr. once said that the church “is not the master or the servant 
of the state, but rather the conscience of the state.”172  When their own houses are in 
good order, churches are well situated to play this important prophetic role. Well-
ordered churches, in this sense, make for effective thorns in the sides of complacent 
societies and states. Healthy and vibrant churches are well situated to serve a number 
of other important functions within society, too. Christian communities that more fully 
embody the rights and duties they profess can act as a sort of ballast in otherwise 
turbulent contexts. Like other religious organizations, they can catalyze social, 
intellectual, and material exchange among citizens; trigger economic, charitable, and 
educational impulses; provide healthy checks and counterpoints to social and individual 
excess; build relationships across racial and ethnic boundaries; diffuse social and 
political crises and absolutisms by relativizing everyday life and its institutions; transmit 
cultural traditions, wisdom, and memories; provide leadership and aid amidst social 
crises and natural disasters; form persons in the virtues and skills of civic engagement 
and shared decision-making processes; provide material aid to the underprivileged and 
downtrodden members of society; enrich and structure family life and other important 
relationships; and more.173 Taken together, these tasks represent a tall order for a 
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community of fallible humans. Yet, as Dr. King reminded his listeners, “if the church will 
free itself from the shackles of a deadening status quo, and, recovering its great historic 
mission, will speak and act fearlessly and insistently in terms of justice and peace, it will 
enkindle the imagination of mankind and fire the souls of men, imbuing them with a 
glowing and ardent love for truth, justice, and peace. Men far and near will know the 
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